Flouting the Law by Nadler, Janice
Northwestern University School of Law
Public Law and Legal Theory Papers
Year  Paper 
Flouting the Law
Janice Nadler∗
∗Northwestern University School of Law, jnadler@northwestern.edu
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commer-
cially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art21
Copyright c©2005 by the author.
Flouting the Law
Janice Nadler
Abstract
What happens when a person’s common-sense view of justice diverges from the
sense of justice he or she sees enshrined in particular laws? In particular, does the
perception of one particular law as unjust make an individual less likely to comply
with unrelated laws? This Article advances the Flouting Thesis - the idea that the
perceived legitimacy of one law or legal outcome can influence one’s willingness
to comply with unrelated laws - and provides original experimental evidence to
support this thesis. The results suggest that willingness to disobey the law can
extend far beyond the particular unjust law in question, to willingness to flout
unrelated laws commonly encountered in everyday life (such as traffic violations,
petty theft, and copyright restrictions), as well as willingness of mock jurors to en-
gage in juror nullification. Finally, this Article explores the relationship between
perceived injustice and flouting and offers several possible explanations, includ-
ing the role of law in American popular culture and the expressive function of the
law in producing compliance.
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What happens when a person’s commonsense view of justice diverges from the 
sense of justice he or she sees enshrined in particular laws?  Does the perception of one 
particular law as unjust make an individual less likely to comply with unrelated laws?  
This Article advances the Flouting Thesis—the idea that the perceived legitimacy of one 
law or legal outcome can influence one’s willingness to comply with unrelated laws—and 
provides original experimental evidence to support this thesis.  The results suggest that 
willingness to disobey the law can extend far beyond the particular unjust law in 
question, to willingness to flout unrelated laws commonly encountered in everyday life 
(such as traffic violations, petty theft, and copyright restrictions), as well as willingness 
of mock jurors to engage in juror nullification.  Finally, this Article explores the relation-
ship between perceived injustice and flouting and offers several possible explanations, 
including the role of law in American popular culture and the expressive function of the 
law in producing compliance. 
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I. Introduction 
Do ordinary citizens flout the law in response to a specific instance of 
perceived injustice?  The idea that general lawbreaking can emerge from one 
unjust legal doctrine or decision has intuitive appeal.  For example, Professor 
David Cole has argued that constitutional doctrines that allow untrammeled 
police discretion—such as that which led to the brutal beating of Rodney 
King in Los Angeles or the tragic police shooting of Amadou Diallo in New 
York—can undermine the public’s perception of the legitimacy of law 
enforcement generally.1  This loss of legitimacy and distrust of the fairness of 
the legal system, Cole argues, can in turn lead to more widespread 
lawbreaking.2 
The Rodney King example is instructive in this regard.  In 1992, the 
acquittal of the four police officers who beat Rodney King touched off the 
worst civil unrest seen in any American city in nearly thirty years.  The 
streets of Los Angeles became the site of chaos and lawlessness.  For four 
days, city residents looted stores, destroyed property, assaulted and shot one 
another, and set buildings on fire.  When it was over, more than fifty people 
were dead,3 nearly 12,000 people were arrested,4 and over 800 buildings 
were burned to the ground.5  Undoubtedly, the causes contributing to the 
expression of community frustration during this time were numerous and 
complex.6  However, there is no doubt that the perceived injustice of the 
acquittals of the police officers was a “proximate” cause of the 1992 civil 
unrest in Los Angeles.7 
The 1992 Los Angeles example is an extreme one to be sure.  At the 
same time, it suggests further, more general questions—questions that are at 
 
1. See David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New 
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1090–91 (1999) (arguing that, for people who 
distrust the legal system, violation of the law is often “romanticized, idealized, condoned, or even 
celebrated”); see also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 171–72 (1999) (noting that those who view police performance 
unfavorably are less likely to comply with the law). 
2. See COLE, supra note 1, at 169–78 (discussing how race-based inequality in the criminal 
justice system encourages crime). 
3. Lou Cannon, Scars Remain Five Years After Los Angeles Riots, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1997, 
at A4. 
4. Diego Ribadeneira, Life Regains its Bustle in Los Angeles, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5, 1992, at 
13. 
5. Cannon, supra note 3, at A4. 
6. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Closing of the American City, NEW REPUBLIC, May 11, 
1998, at 40 (asserting that rioting became out of hand because of the failure of both police and 
political leadership). 
7. The initial beating incident and subsequent trial were both widely publicized; the videotape 
of the beatings was played repeatedly in the months leading up to the trial.  The jury’s decision to 
acquit the police officers was widely held to be unjust.  World Politics and Current Affairs; 
American Survey, ECONOMIST, May 2, 1992, at 27.  For some, these feelings of injustice were so 
strong that they led to extreme frustration and anger, as evidenced by the sharp increase in 
lawbreaking over the next few days. 
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bottom empirical—about whether, and under what circumstances, citizens’ 
perceptions of injustice lead to diminished deference to the law generally.  
Does perceived injustice in our legal system—whether in the form of 
wrongful convictions or acquittals, excessive punitive damage awards, 
outmoded public morals statutes, sentencing disparities between crack 
cocaine and powder cocaine, or mandatory minimum sentencing regimes—
lead to greater willingness to flout the law in the everyday lives of ordinary 
people?  Further, assuming that this is the case, does flouting typically 
manifest itself not in mass unrest but in more subtle, lower-level, and harder-
to-detect ways, such as littering, tax cheating, theft of services, and jury 
nullification? 
The idea that there is a relationship between perceived injustice of 
specific laws and diminished general compliance with the law has been either 
proposed or assumed by many theorists in a variety of contexts.8  For the pur-
poses of discussion in this Article, I call this idea the Flouting Thesis.  
Despite its prominence, there is, however, a glaring absence of empirical 
evidence regarding the Flouting Thesis, which has been widely assumed but 
never proven.9  Investigating the possibility that lawbreaking can flow from 
perceived injustice is central to our understanding of how to secure citizen 
cooperation and compliance with legal rules, and so the lack of empirical 
investigation regarding the Flouting Thesis is puzzling.  This Article begins 
to fill this void by presenting the first experimental evidence for the Flouting 
Thesis and by empirically confirming that perceived legal injustices10 can 
have subtle but pervasive influences on a person’s deference to the law in his 
or her everyday life.  In this Article, I argue that Americans are culturally 
attentive to law and feel concerned when they notice injustice in the legal 
system.  When a person evaluates particular legal rules, decisions, or 
practices as unjust, the diminished respect for the legal system that follows 
can destabilize otherwise law-abiding behavior.  Economic theories of legal 
compliance uniformly focus on the expected value of outcomes shaped by 
threatened punishment.  But economic theories uniformly ignore the 
possibility that there are reasons for obeying the law apart from the threat of 
sanctions. 
 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. Although different but related theories have been tested empirically—several are discussed in 
Part II of this Article—an exhaustive literature search revealed no experimental test of the thesis 
that there is a relationship between perceived injustice of legal rules or decisions and reduced 
compliance with the law generally.  In other works, I have emphasized the importance, as a general 
matter, of reducing arbitrariness in the application of the law.  See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: 
Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153; Janice Nadler & Mary R. 
Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419 
(2003). 
10. I use the term “perceived injustice” throughout the Article because my focus is on the 
psychology of justice, and more specifically, on the justice perceptions of ordinary people.  In this 
Article, I do not address philosophical issues regarding justice, and I make no assumptions about the 
actual justness of the underlying legal rules or legal outcomes that I discuss. 
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The broader focus of this Article is on the ways in which law can 
influence citizen behavior other than through threatened punishment.  As 
such, this Article is part of a broader movement emerging in legal scholar-
ship that examines theories of expressive law.11  Cass Sunstein and others 
have argued that, in addition to influencing behavior directly, law also can 
make a statement that strengthens desirable norms and weakens undesirable 
norms.12  For example, antidiscrimination laws may have weakened the norm 
of racial discrimination; laws that require clean-up after one’s pet may 
strengthen the norm of cleaning up, even in the absence of enforcement.13  
Others—such as Richard McAdams—have focused on the mechanisms 
through which the values the law expresses can induce compliance, quite 
independently from the sanctions the law threatens.14  For example, laws 
banning smoking signaled to smokers a new societal consensus that exposing 
others to smoke is offensive and antisocial, triggering smokers to refrain 
from smoking in certain public places for fear of enduring objections from 
people nearby.15  The antismoking values expressed by law induced smokers 
to comply with minimal state enforcement of antismoking ordinances.  More 
closely related to the topic of this Article, scholars focusing on compliance 
with criminal law have also noted that the expressive power of law can back-
fire when a law inadvertently generates disrespect.  For example, a well-
publicized government crackdown on tax cheating can implicitly send the 
message that everyone cheats, thereby generating more cheating than would 
be observed without the crackdown.16  More generally, these scholars argue 
that when law is perceived as failing to accurately reflect popular notions of 
justice, then citizens will be less likely to view the law as a moral authority 
that guides their own behavior.17  It is this theory of expressive law that I test 
empirically in this Article. 
 
11. The idea that law has a symbolic function apart from directing behavior by imposing 
punishment on violators is fundamental to the law and society literature.  See, e.g., JOHANNES 
ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 112 (1974). 
12. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).  
Similarly, Lawrence Lessig has argued that law can change the norms that underlie the social 
meaning associated with the behavior regulated.  See Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996). 
13. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2032–33, 2043–44. 
14. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 338, 355 (1997) (arguing that laws can give rise to strong norms to which people conform 
to avoid esteem sanctions); see also Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More 
Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 404 
(1994) (“[T]he route by which laws create and maintain order is through the creation or alteration of 
social norms . . . our thesis is that decentralized order is accomplished by internalizing as social 
norms those laws that are just and perceived to be fair.”). 
15. McAdams, supra note 14, at 405. 
16. Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 342 (2001). 
17. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 
(1997). 
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Before presenting the evidence that injustice can encourage 
lawbreaking, I first discuss in Part II the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of the Flouting Thesis, including the reasons for believing that 
laws perceived as unjust can generate general disrespect and increased 
lawbreaking.  In Part III, I report the results of three original laboratory 
experiments which suggest that perceived legal injustice can indeed reduce 
people’s willingness to obey laws in their everyday lives—like speed limits 
and copyright restrictions—and can also reduce citizens’ willingness to 
follow the law in their role as jurors in the courtroom.  In Part IV of the 
Article, I explore potential explanations for why perceived injustice in the 
legal system might cause citizens to have less deference for the law.  In Part 
V, I discuss possible remedies. 
In this Article, I describe three experiments in which I expose people to 
instances of legal injustice and then measure their willingness to break the 
law in their everyday lives.  Together, these experiments contemplate two 
different prototypes of perceived injustice in the law that can have 
consequences that reach beyond the rule or case in question.  The first—
examined in Experiment 1—is a legal rule that is viewed by most people as 
being ill-conceived, such as a rule permitting the government to seize the 
property of an innocent farmer whose land is used by a marijuana grower.  
The second—examined in Experiments 2a and 2b—is a legal result whereby 
the law does not punish a person who is viewed by most people as deserving 
of punishment.18  Together, the results of these experiments show empirically 
that discrepancies between commonsense justice and legal practices can have 
unanticipated behavioral consequences.  I conclude with an exploratory 
discussion about how to reduce these discrepancies by selectively 
harmonizing legal rules and social norms. 
II. Theories of Legal Compliance and Perceived Injustice 
As noted earlier, perceived legal injustice can take a variety of forms.  
The 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest arose as a response to public outrage 
about acquittals in a widely publicized criminal trial.  Decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court that clash with strongly held popular beliefs are another form 
of perceived injustice.  Indeed, certain Supreme Court Justices at various 
times have assumed the truth of the Flouting Thesis when faced with the 
prospect that the Court’s announced decision will be at odds with 
commonsense justice.  For example, in discussing the permissibility of police 
 
18. There are undoubtedly many other types and sources of perceived legal injustice.  
Accordingly, this Article does not aspire to enumerate all of the boundary conditions of the 
relationship between perceived injustice and lawbreaking—there are many possible circumstances 
under which the law can inadvertently generate disrespect, and this Article does not seek to catalog 
them here. 
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wiretapping without a search warrant, Justice Brandeis argued in his famous 
dissent in Olmstead v. United States: “If the Government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law 
unto himself; it invites anarchy.”19  Similarly, in discussing the application of 
antitrust laws to baseball, Justice Marshall expressed concern that the Court’s 
decision would undermine respect for law: 
 The jurist concerned with public confidence in, and acceptance of 
the judicial system might well consider that, however admirable its 
resolute adherence to the law as it was, a decision contrary to the 
public sense of justice as it is, operates, so far as it is known, to 
diminish respect for the courts and for law itself.20 
Perceived injustice can also arise from criminal punishment schemes 
that do not accurately reflect commonsense notions of desert.  A variety of 
legal scholars and philosophers of law have recognized the possibility that 
disproportionate punishments can promote lawbreaking among citizens.  For 
example, H. L. A. Hart argued that, in designing a morally acceptable system 
of criminal punishment, we should draw upon commonsense notions 
regarding appropriate punishment given the gravity of the offense in 
question.21  He contended that, if legally defined gradation of crimes differed 
sharply from the commonsense consensus, “there is a risk of either confusing 
common morality or flouting it and bringing the law into contempt.”22  
Similarly, Kent Greenawalt has proposed that punishment schemes based on 
retributive principles can promote compliance with the law: “The idea is that 
since people naturally think in retributive terms, they will be disenchanted 
and eventually less law-abiding if the law does not recognize that offenders 
should receive the punishment they ‘deserve.’”23 
Paul Robinson and John Darley have offered the most comprehensive 
theoretical treatment of the “utility of desert”: the notion that by tying 
criminal liability and punishment to community-based notions of justice and 
desert, public compliance with the law will increase.24  Robinson and Darley 
argue that when the criminal law gains a reputation for assigning liability and 
 
19. 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
20. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Peter L. 
Szanton, Stare Decisis; A Dissenting View, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 394, 397 (1959)). 
21. H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (1968). 
22. Id. 
23. Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 359 (1983).  Note that 
Greenawalt’s assertion that “people naturally think in retributive terms” has begun to be borne out 
in social psychological research on perceptions of punishment.  See Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why 
Do We Punish?  Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002) (showing that people’s motivations to punish are driven by retributive 
considerations); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 
24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659 (2000) (same). 
24. Robinson & Darley, supra note 17. 
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punishment in ways that track the intuition of the community as a whole, it is 
more likely to be viewed as morally authoritative.  As a result, people are 
more likely to defer to the commands of the law generally.25  Robinson and 
Darley argue that most people obey the law as a general matter, not so much 
because they are deterred by the possibility of being caught and punished, but 
because they either fear disapproval from their social group, or they want to 
do the morally correct thing—or both.26  But the norms held by one’s social 
group are themselves influenced and strengthened by the criminal law.  
Every criminal adjudication offers an opportunity to remind the public of the 
underlying norm that prohibits the conduct in question.27  Legislative 
proposals for new criminal law rules provide an occasion for public debate 
that strengthens the shared understanding of what conduct is prohibited.28  
Further, if the law has moral credibility, it can guide behavior in situations in 
which the harm underlying the prohibition is not immediately obvious.29 
According to Robinson and Darley, then, the moral credibility of the 
law can strengthen social norms and increase compliance.  Because moral 
credibility plays a key role here, it is important to understand how the law 
comes to be viewed as a moral authority in the first place.  Robinson and 
Darley contend that the criminal law gains moral credibility from imposing 
liability and punishment only on conduct that deserves moral condemnation 
and, conversely, from not imposing liability or punishment for conduct that 
does not deserve moral condemnation.30  When a particular criminal rule 
conflicts with the moral intuitions of the governed community, the power of 
the criminal law as a whole to induce compliance is in jeopardy because it is 
no longer viewed as a trustworthy source of information regarding which 
actions are moral and which are not.31  In sum, this version of the Flouting 
Thesis derives from the claim that adopting desert-based (retributive) notions 
of criminal liability and punishment that closely track community intuitions 
promotes compliance.32 
Criminal law theorists who support the notion that liability and 
punishment track commonsense justice are joined by others who are 
concerned about the fairness of specific laws.  For example, a commission of 
police officers, academics, and politicians appointed to study Britain’s drug 
 
25. Id. at 457. 
26. Id. at 468–69. 
27. Id. at 472. 
28. Id. at 473. 
29. Id. at 475–76. 
30. Id. at 477–78.  There are separate questions of how a person decides which conduct 
deserves moral condemnation.  These questions about the psychology of assigning blame and 
punishment are beyond the scope of this Article. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
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laws concluded that Britain’s tough marijuana laws produce more harm than 
they prevent.33  The commission’s report asserted that Britain’s tough 
marijuana laws are perceived as focusing on a drug that most people think is 
not dangerous, thus undermining the credibility and respect for law.34  The 
report concludes: “There can be no doubt that, in implementing the law, the 
present concentration [by law enforcement] on cannabis weakens respect for 
the law.”35 
It is worthy to note at this point that all of the variations on the Flouting 
Thesis reviewed so far share an important feature; they have never been 
tested.  Thirty years ago, Lawrence Friedman noted that there is much yet to 
be discovered about the Flouting Thesis: 
If a person sees unfairness or illegitimacy or unworthiness of trust in 
one instance, how far does his disillusionment extend?  How much of 
his attitude spills over into other areas and into his actual behavior?  
The hypocrisy and unfairness of Prohibition, it is said, brought the 
whole legal system into disrepute.  Legal scholars claim that 
marijuana laws “hasten the erosion of respect for the law.”  But how 
much “erosion of respect”?  And where?  And what are the 
consequences?36 
Yet even today, we do not know much more about the Flouting Thesis than 
we did when Professor Friedman posed these questions.  Although related 
theories have been tested empirically,37 an exhaustive literature search 
revealed no empirical test of the thesis that there is a relationship between 
perceived injustice of particular legal rules or outcomes and reduced 
compliance with the law generally.  This Article thus represents an initial 
attempt to investigate the most basic question raised by the Flouting Thesis: 
whether a perceived unjust law leads to lower levels of compliance with 
unrelated laws.  As an initial investigation, this Article does not (and cannot) 
aspire to address the important boundary conditions delineated by Professor 
Friedman; these questions must, of necessity, be left to another day.  In the 
next Part, I present the results of three experiments designed to test the basic 
claim of the Flouting Thesis. 
 
33. THE POLICE FOUNDATION, DRUGS AND THE LAW: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY 
INTO THE MISUSE OF DRUGS ACT 1971, at 115 (2000), available at http://www.police-
foundation.org.uk. 
34. Id. at 7, 10. 
35. Id. at 115. 
36. Lawrence Friedman, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 118–19 
(1975). 
37. See infra subpart III(A). 
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III. Experimental Evidence for the Flouting Thesis 
A. Background: Related Theories and Evidence 
Whereas there is no existing empirical evidence examining the 
connection between perceived injustice of a particular law and general 
noncompliance, there is evidence on associated questions.  This evidence 
shows first that people are most likely to obey laws that prohibit conduct they 
already view as morally reprehensible.  For example, people who feel 
strongly that an activity prohibited by a particular criminal offense (such as 
larceny) is morally wrong are least likely to report having committed that 
offense; likewise, people who feel less strongly that the offense is morally 
wrong are most likely to report having committed the offense.38  In addition 
to moral attitudes about specific crimes, moral attitudes about the legal 
system in general predict compliance with particular laws.  For example, 
feelings of obligation to obey the law in general (such as the belief that 
“people should obey the law even if they disagree”) predict whether people 
will comply with laws governing everyday acts such as littering, making 
noise, parking, and the like.39  Note that this is a different question than the 
question of interest in this Article: variations in feelings of obligation to obey 
the law generally can arise for many different reasons, including pre-existing 
variations across individuals (due to personality, political and moral values, 
past personal encounters with law enforcement, and the like).  By contrast, 
the question of interest in this Article focuses on the problem of a particular 
legal doctrine, rule, or decision viewed as unjust, and the subsequent effects 
on not only feelings of obligation to obey that law, but also on behavioral 
compliance with laws in general. 
Related to the question of people’s general sense of obligation to obey 
the law is the question of trust in legal institutions and procedures.  Work in 
this area has demonstrated that people have more trust in the police and in 
the courts when police officers and judges make their decisions using fair 
 
38. Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Criminal Deterrence, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 442, 
445–47 (1976).  Similarly, Grasmick and Green surveyed people about their compliance with eight 
different criminal laws and obtained similar findings; they found that the people with high levels of 
moral commitment toward a particular law were more likely to report compliance with that law.  
Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization 
as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 334 (1980). 
39. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 41–68 (1990) (finding that perceived 
legitimacy of legal authorities increases the likelihood of compliance with the law).  Compliance 
with the law in Tyler’s study was associated with two main factors—the extent to which people felt 
that the particular conduct prohibited by the law is morally wrong (results that are consistent with 
the reported findings of Silberman, supra note 38, as well as Grasmick & Green, supra note 38) and 
the extent to which people felt generally that the law is something that deserves respect and ought to 
be obeyed.  TYLER, supra, at 44–50, 57, 60, 64. 
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procedures.40  The use of fair procedures makes it more likely that people 
will conclude that the legal authorities with whom they are dealing are acting 
in good faith and that motives underlying these authorities’ actions are 
benevolent.41  Questions of procedural justice and trust in legal authorities, 
however, are distinct from the question of interest in this Article.  Work in 
procedural justice has shown that when a person has a positive experience 
with the police or in court, that person is more likely to feel satisfied with the 
process and is ultimately more willing to accept the police officer’s or court’s 
decision.42  This Article, by contrast, focuses not on people’s perceptions of 
the procedures used by legal authorities (like police) or institutions (like 
courts), but rather on people’s perceptions of the fairness of substantive laws 
(like criminal statutes) and decisions (like verdicts and punishment 
judgments).  Whereas procedural justice focuses on fairness of treatment 
(including being treated with dignity and respect), the Flouting Thesis as 
examined in this Article focuses on the fairness of the law itself and the 
consequences for future compliance with unrelated laws. 
Another important difference between the Flouting Thesis explored in 
this Article and the work on procedural justice is that the latter focuses 
chiefly on the extent to which a person’s own experiences with legal 
authorities influence that person’s trust in those authorities.  This Article, by 
contrast, focuses on vicarious experiences with legal injustice.  Most people 
do not experience the legal system directly.43  However, all ordinary people 
experience the legal system vicariously, both through others they know who 
themselves experience it directly (a family member is arrested; an associate 
is audited; a best friend is divorced), as well as through messages in media 
and popular culture which mold our attitudes toward and understanding of 
the legal system.  Vicarious experiences with the legal system are far more 
common than direct experiences—we read and hear about others’ 
experiences in the legal system everyday. 
Vicarious justice experiences are the central focus of the social 
psychology of moral mandates—the stands people take that develop out of 
strong moral convictions.44  A person’s moral conviction that the guilty must 
 
40. Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 
B.U. L. REV. 361, 378–79 (2001). 
41. Id. at 363, 366, 374–75.  See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: 
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002). 
42. See Tyler, supra note 40, at 378–79. 
43. See generally Stewart Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, 
Entertainment, and Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 187 (1987) (canvassing Americans’ 
everyday experiences where they gain education and knowledge of the law and illustrating how 
important these experiences are in light of the fact that very few people have actual contact with the 
court and legal mechanisms in their everyday lives). 
44. See Linda J. Skitka, Do the Means Always Justify the Ends, or Do the Ends Sometimes 
Justify the Means?  A Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
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be punished (and the innocent must not) influences fairness perceptions.45  If 
a given procedure leads to a guilty person being punished (or an innocent 
person being exonerated), then that procedure will likely be viewed as fair 
(as will the outcome).46  Conversely, if a given procedure yields a morally 
unjustified outcome, then that procedure will likely be viewed as unfair.47  
Further, feelings of anger in the face of a threat to a moral mandate lead to 
perceptions of unfairness.48  Anger in the face of perceived threats to morally 
mandated outcomes is certainly consistent with the Flouting Thesis.  But to 
date, the work on moral mandates has not yet investigated the behavioral 
consequences of threats to moral mandates; that is the central question of this 
Article. 
A survey study of tax compliance is perhaps the one study that most 
closely addresses the specific question addressed by this Article: what is the 
relationship between perceived injustice in the law in a particular instance 
and more general attitudes about respect for the law and compliance?49  In 
the tax survey, people reported on both their own experiences with the IRS, 
as well as on second-hand information about the experiences of friends, 
neighbors, and coworkers with the IRS.50  Especially revealing were the 
attitudes of people who reported that a friend’s, neighbor’s, or coworker’s 
contact with the IRS resulted in that person paying more taxes than they 
supposedly owed.  This type of vicarious experience with the IRS was 
associated with lower perceptions of the fairness of tax laws generally and 
increased intentions to cheat on taxes in the future.51 
The results of the tax study suggest that exposure to reports of an unjust 
legal outcome in a particular situation might lead to lower perceived fairness 
of the law more generally, which in turn can lead to noncompliance with the 
 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 588, 589 (2002) (showing that personal identity concerns influence how people 
decide whether an event is fair or unfair). 
45. See Linda J. Skitka & David A. Houston, When Due Process Is of No Consequence: Moral 
Mandates and Presumed Defendant Guilt or Innocence, 14 SOC. JUST. RES. 305, 323–24 (2001) 
(finding that people see criminal trial outcomes in morally mandated terms). 
46. Id. at 317. 
47. Id.  Interestingly, the finding that the perceived moral correctness of an outcome strongly 
influences perceptions of procedural fairness is directly contrary to findings in the social 
psychology of procedural justice.  See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
48. See Elizabeth Mullen & Linda J. Skitka, Exploring the Psychological Underpinnings of the 
Moral Mandate Effect: Motivated Reasoning, Identification, or Affective Heuristic?, 89 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (manuscript at 2) (forthcoming 2006) (on file with the Texas Law 
Review) (showing that anger associated with verdicts that violated a moral mandate colored fairness 
judgments). 
49. Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of 
Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 259, 264–76 
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (describing the results of a 1988 telephone survey about tax compliance). 
50. Id. at 264. 
51. Id. at 276. 
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law in the future.  The conclusions to be drawn from the tax survey results 
are, however, limited in several important respects.  First, all of the data was 
correlational,52 so that the causal direction (if causation can be inferred at all) 
of the connection between exposure to a perceived unjust outcome and lower 
intentions to comply with the law was ambiguous.  It might be, for example, 
that a person’s intention to cheat on her own taxes produced an evaluation 
that others’ experiences with the IRS were unfair. 
Second, the tax survey study addressed only the limited question of 
whether the justice of an outcome relating to one law (or set of laws) is 
associated with lower future compliance with that same law (or set of 
laws)—in this case, tax laws.  The claim I test in this Article, by contrast, is a 
stronger one: perceived injustice of a particular law diminishes respect for 
the law in general, which is manifested in lower levels of compliance with 
other laws, even those distinct from, and unrelated to, the source of the 
perceived injustice.  The experimental data reported below show empirically 
that legal injustice can trigger diminished compliance, not only with respect 
to the unjust law in question, but also with respect to other unrelated laws.  In 
the remainder of this Part, I use original empirical results to show that 
perceived injustice in a legal rule can generate broader flouting of the law in 
everyday life. 
B. Experiment 1: Testing the Flouting Thesis via Intentions to Comply 
1. Background.—To test the plausibility of the Flouting Thesis, I 
identified a specific underlying hypothesis and tested it experimentally.  
According to the Flouting Thesis, the belief that a particular law is unjust 
increases the likelihood of flouting the law in one’s own daily life (even laws 
that are unrelated to the unjust law in question); conversely, the absence of 
perceived injustice should not increase flouting behavior.  In the experiment, 
I presented a set of ostensible, proposed legislation designed to be interpreted 
as either just or unjust.  By carefully varying the description of the ostensible 
legislation, I ensured (through pilot testing) that participants perceived the 
laws in question as basically unjust (treatment group) or as basically just 
(control group).  According to the Flouting Thesis, the participant’s attitude 
regarding the perceived injustice of laws should diminish his or her 
willingness to comply with different, unrelated laws. 
The predictions of the Flouting Thesis focus essentially on a set of 
behavioral results: compliance with the law.  At the same time, the predictive 
variable of the Flouting Thesis is a set of attitudes (about the injustice of 
specific laws).  Generally speaking, however, the relationship between 
 
52. Id. at 262–63. 
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attitudes and behavior is not always straightforward.53  One of the factors 
upon which the relevant behavioral response depends is the accessibility in 
memory of the attitude in question.  The more easily an attitude is called to 
mind, the more likely it is to influence the cognitive structure of the 
behavioral event in question, and thus the more likely a response will follow 
that is behaviorally congruent with the attitude.54  In the context of 
perceptions of the law, the extent to which an attitude about the justice of a 
particular law affects compliance behavior may depend on the extent to 
which that attitude is accessible.55 
Thus, for the purposes of this experiment, it was important to ensure the 
salience in memory of the attitudes in question, here the perceived justice of 
the laws presented.  For this reason, this study used a priming method in 
which the attitude is called to mind and is accessible at the time compliance 
behavior is measured.56 
2. Experimental Method.—The experiment consisted of two parts.  
First, participants were exposed to a set of laws (perceived as either just or 
unjust) in the form of newspaper stories.  Participants read six news stories, 
three that focused on a legal issue, and three that did not.  The three news 
stories describing legal statutes were interspersed with the nonlegal news 
stories, thus focusing attention away from the purely legal nature of the task.  
Then, in an ostensibly separate study, the same people indicated their 
willingness to flout a set of unrelated laws in the future.  Willingness to 
disobey the law (flouting) was measured by using a questionnaire that 
focused on intentions to engage in fairly common, but legally prohibited, 
acts.57 
 
53. Indeed, the conditions under which people exhibit consistency between their attitudes and 
their behavior is a question that social psychologists continue to debate.  See generally, e.g., Icek 
Ajzen et al., Explaining the Discrepancy Between Intentions and Actions: The Case of Hypothetical 
Bias in Contingent Valuation, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1108 (2004) 
(demonstrating that, in the context of a hypothetical donation to charity, people overestimate the 
likelihood that they will engage in socially desirable behavior); Richard T. LaPiere, Attitudes vs. 
Actions, 13 SOC. FORCES 230 (1934). 
54. See Russell H. Fazio, How Do Attitudes Guide Behavior?, in HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION 
AND COGNITION: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 204, 208–10 (Richard M. Sorrentino & E. 
Tory Higgins eds., 1986). 
55. In other words, the more salient an attitude is in memory, the more likely the resulting 
behavioral response will be attitudinally congruent. 
56. A prime is a means of accessing or activating stored thoughts and concepts. 
57. The law breaking measured here was not intended to represent a fair sample of all behavior 
that is prohibited by the law.  Rather, I sought to measure people’s intentions to break laws that they 
encounter on an everyday basis.  I contend that it is these everyday laws that are most vulnerable to 
flouting following perceived injustice, because of increased opportunity and lower levels of 
inhibition, compared to laws prohibiting very serious (but more rare) acts such as robbery or 
murder.  Moreover, as a practical matter, it would be exceedingly difficult to measure willingness to 
engage in these latter, more serious, offenses, precisely because they are less common, and also 
because people would be less likely to admit to engaging in them. 
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Newspaper stories were chosen to present the laws of interest in the first 
part of the experiment for several reasons.  First, material presented in a 
newspaper story format has inherent appeal as a current-event item and is 
therefore more likely to engage people’s interest when compared to the 
sometimes dense language used in legal statutes.  Indeed, other research has 
demonstrated that reading newspaper stories about current events can 
increase a person’s societal-level concern about the problem at hand.58  
Second, newspaper stories provided a convenient cover story for the first part 
of the experiment.  Participants were told that the researchers were interested 
in their emotional reactions to the quality of the writing and the style of 
journalism in the news stories.  In the absence of such a cover story, 
participants may have been left to speculate about the purpose of reading 
legal statutes. 
The participants were 98 undergraduate students.59  Upon entering the 
laboratory and signing a consent form, participants were informed that they 
would be participating in a study on the role of emotions in attitudes about 
news stories.  Participants each read a set of six articles that were ostensibly 
newspaper stories.60  Three of these were filler stories (on NASA, oil drilling, 
and movie ushers) that were identical in content for all participants.  Three 
were stories describing legislation, for which there were two versions—one 
set of stories was designed to elicit a perception that the laws described 
therein are just (Just Prime condition), and the other set was designed to elicit 
a perception that the laws described therein are unjust (Unjust Prime 
condition).  The content of each version varied slightly from its counterpart, 
depending on the experimental condition.  The basic topics of the law-related 
stories are illustrated in Table 1.  Perceived justness was manipulated by 
varying each story’s emphasis, as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58. See Tom R. Tyler & Fay L. Cook, The Mass Media and Judgments of Risk: Distinguishing 
Impact on Personal and Societal Level Judgments, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 693, 695–
704 (1984) (finding in three studies that exposure to relevant media stories influenced “societal 
level judgments” about social problems such as drunk driving and cancer). 
59. Of these participants, there were 54 females, 44 males, 27 African Americans, 24 Asians or 
Asian Americans, 23 Hispanics, 22 whites, and 2 self-designated as “other.” 
60. The length of all stories was kept constant at approximately 500 words. 
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TABLE 1.  CONTENT OF NEWSPAPER STORIES CONTAINING PRIMES 
News Story General Emphasis (both versions) Just Prime Version 
Unjust Prime 
Version 
Civil 
Forfeiture 
Purpose and application of 
(actual) laws permitting the 
government to seize 
property under certain 
circumstances 
Emphasized the law 
enforcement benefits 
of civil forfeiture 
laws 
Emphasized the 
civil liberties 
concerns 
surrounding civil 
forfeiture laws 
Income Tax 
Proposed legislation 
ostensibly pending before 
Congress that would affect 
the amount of income tax 
paid by middle class 
taxpayers 
Emphasized positive 
effects of income tax 
paid by middle class 
people 
Emphasized 
negative effects of 
income tax paid by 
middle class people 
Landlord/ 
Tenant 
Proposed legislation 
ostensibly pending before 
the state legislature that 
would permit landlords to 
conduct warrantless searches 
of tenants’ apartments under 
certain circumstances 
Emphasized 
importance of 
empowering 
landlords to evict 
drug-dealing tenants 
Emphasized the 
civil liberties and 
privacy concerns in 
permitting searches 
of tenants’ 
apartments 
 
A pilot test of the materials using different participants61 indicated that 
the legal rules described in the three law-related newspaper stories presented 
in the Just Prime condition were perceived to be significantly more just, on 
average, than those presented in the Unjust Prime condition.62 
Participants were randomly assigned to the Just Prime or Unjust Prime 
condition.  After reading each of the six stories, participants answered a 
“quiz” question, to ensure they actually read the story.  In addition, following 
each story, participants filled out a questionnaire assessing their opinion of 
the journalistic quality of the story they just read.63  The experimenter then 
collected all materials, thanked the participants, and left the room. 
Shortly after the first experimenter left, a different experimenter entered 
the room and asked participants to sign a different consent form, explaining 
that they would be asked to participate in a second short experiment.  After 
performing a short filler task, participants completed the Likelihood of 
 
61. The participants in the pilot test were drawn from the same undergraduate population as 
those in the experiment itself. 
62. Eighty-eight undergraduate psychology students participated in the pilot study.  Each 
participant read one version of each of the three articles and rated the extent to which the law 
described in the article was either just or unjust (1 – extremely unjust; 9 – extremely just).  Mean 
ratings in the Just Prime condition (M = 5.05) were significantly higher than mean ratings in the 
Unjust Prime condition (M = 2.95); t(86) = -9.25; p < .0001.  Most participants (39 out of 44) in the 
Just Prime condition assigned ratings of 5 or above to the stories; nearly all participants (43 out of 
44) in the Unjust Prime condition assigned ratings of below 5. 
63. Participants were asked to indicate the story’s clarity, conciseness, level of interest, and so 
forth. 
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Criminal Behavior Questionnaire.  In this questionnaire, participants were 
asked to indicate the likelihood (from 0% to 100%) that they would engage 
in a variety of illegal behaviors.  These items consisted of: drunk driving, 
parking in a no-parking zone, failing to pay required taxes, making illegal 
copies of software, eating a small item without paying in the grocery store, 
exceeding the posted speed limit, drinking alcohol under age 21, and taking 
home office supplies for personal use.64 
3. Experimental Results.—An analysis of each individual questionnaire 
item reveals an overall trend:65 participants exposed to unjust laws indicated 
a greater likelihood of engaging in each criminal behavior compared to those 
exposed to just laws.  This is illustrated in Figure 1.66 
 
FIGURE 1.  WILLINGNESS TO FLOUT AS A FUNCTION OF 
EXPOSURE TO UNJUST LAWS IN EXPERIMENT 1 
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64. I chose these particular crimes to maximize variation in responses.  Considering the range 
of acts that are prohibited by the criminal law, the six that I tested are fairly common among those 
who consider themselves law-abiding citizens.  Had I chosen relatively more serious crimes, such as 
murder or robbery, the responses would have likely been clustered near 0%, making it difficult to 
detect any differences attributable to the Unjust Prime. 
65. The tax item is the only item in Figure 1 in which there is no apparent difference between 
those primed with Just laws and those primed with Unjust laws.  Note, however, that participants 
were undergraduate students, with a mean age of 18.7.  Most of them probably have had little or no 
experience in filing an income tax return. 
66. In Figure 1, the scores are presented in raw, rather than standardized, form for ease of 
presentation and interpretation.  Item labels marked with one asterisk are associated with a test 
statistic with a p-value less than .10; two asterisks indicate a p-value less than .05. 
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Figure 1 indicates that, consistent with the Flouting Thesis, people 
exposed to the three newspaper stories describing perceived unjust laws are 
more willing to park illegally, copy unlicensed software, consume grocery 
items without paying, and pilfer office supplies, compared to those exposed 
to perceived just laws.67 
A reliability analysis (Cronbach’s α) indicated that the eight 
questionnaire items could be combined into a single measure of Likelihood 
of Criminal Behavior,68 which was computed by summing scores across 
items.69  The standardized70 Likelihood of Criminal Behavior Index scores 
ranged from a low of -11.95 to a high of 12.38.  Overall, participants exposed 
to newspaper stories describing laws perceived as unjust indicated a 
significantly71 greater mean willingness to engage in criminal behavior 
(M = 1.15) compared to participants exposed to laws perceived as just  
 
67. For DWI, speeding, and underage drinking, the patterns were consistent with the Flouting 
Thesis, but the apparent differences did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.  
Note that attitudes toward drunk driving have shifted fairly dramatically in the last decade or so, 
coinciding with moral campaigns against drunk driving (the most well-known group is Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving (MADD)).  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: 
Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 634 (2000) (reporting that, as a result of 
the MADD campaign, public attitudes with respect to drunk driving “became suddenly more 
condemnatory in the late 1980s”).  Because of the stigma currently associated with drunk driving, 
participants may have been reluctant to admit to doing it, and as a result, there may be a “floor 
effect” here (the ability to detect differences is limited because all scores are low).  Also note 
possible ceiling effects (all scores are high) with speeding and underage drinking. 
68. Cronbach’s α = .82.  Cronbach’s α is a measure of the reliability and internal consistency of 
a scale.  Possible values range from 0 to 1.  See JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE 
REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 129–30 (3d ed. 2003). 
69. Prior to being debriefed, participants completed an Exit Questionnaire designed to 
determine whether they were suspicious that the two parts of the experiment were related.  The 
questionnaire asked participants to indicate the number of studies in which they participated during 
the course of the hour, the purpose of the studies, and the possible relationship between the studies.  
An examination of the Exit Questionnaire responses revealed that none of the participants were 
suspicious as to the priming function of the first part of the experiment.  Specifically, in response to 
the first question, 100% of the participants indicated that they had participated in two experiments.  
In response to the question about the purpose of the studies, 0% of the participants indicated that 
they thought there was any possible connection between the two tasks.  Finally, in response to the 
question about whether they thought their responses in the first study could have affected their 
judgments in the second study, all but two participants responded “No.”  These two respondents 
were nevertheless unable to articulate any basis of substantive influence of the first study on their 
responses in the second study.  Moreover, excluding their data does not change the pattern of results 
reported. 
70. Scores were standardized prior to being combined to account for differences in 
measurement scales across variables.  Standardizing scores distributes them across the same metric 
with Mean = 0 and Standard Deviation = 1.  See COHEN ET AL., supra note 68, at 23–26. 
71. Throughout this Article, “significantly” refers to statistical significance, which denotes the 
rejection of the null hypothesis—the possibility of no differences between the various groups—at a 
probability level indicated by the p-value reported.  Thus, “p” is defined as the probability of 
finding a difference or relationship between two groups as large as that observed if there were, in 
fact, no difference or relationship between them.  WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS 267–82 (5th ed. 
1994). 
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(M = -0.97).72  Thus, exposure to a legal rule generally perceived to be unjust 
leads to personal estimations of a greater likelihood of expressed willingness 
to engage in unrelated future criminal behavior.73 
C. Experiment 2a: Testing the Flouting Thesis via Mock Juror Behavior 
(Student Sample) 
1. Background.—The results of Experiment 1 suggest that when people 
are exposed to unjust laws they are more willing to engage in everyday 
lawbreaking, such as traffic and software violations.  The method used in 
Experiment 1 relies on self-reports—after being exposed to just or unjust 
legal rules, participants estimated the likelihood that they would break the 
law in the future.  These self-reports suggest that the prime had differential 
effects on participants’ attitudes; yet we cannot definitively predict behavior 
from such responses.74  In particular, measuring behavioral compliance with 
the law is difficult because of the ethical and practical problems inherent in 
such an inquiry.  Ethically, difficulties arise if participants have been induced 
or encouraged to violate the law.75 
 
72. t(96) = 2.02; p < .05; Cohen’s d = 0.41.  The t statistic reported throughout this Article tests 
for differences between two independent parametric samples.  Id. at 312–27.  Cohen’s d is a 
measure of the magnitude, or practical significance, of a treatment effect.  As a rule of thumb, 
Cohen’s d is often interpreted as follows: Small Effect Size, d = .2, Medium Effect Size, d = .5, and 
Large Effect Size, d = .8.  See JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 20–27 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining effect size index for variable d). 
73. It is notable that the exposure to perceived unjust laws was minimal in this experiment—the 
task of reading all six news items and answering the quiz and filler questions was completed in less 
than 35 minutes.  Yet, this short exposure was sufficient to significantly influence people’s 
expressed willingness to engage in unlawful behaviors in their everyday lives.  In addition, 
participants were apparently unaware of the influence that the newspaper stories had on their 
willingness to comply with the law: when explicitly asked whether the newspaper articles affected 
their judgments about compliance with the law, they denied such a connection.  It is also important 
to note here that the laws that people were willing to disobey were unrelated to the laws they read 
about previously in the newspaper stories.  The effect observed here spreads from the specific to the 
general. 
74. See ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLEY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 155–216 
(1993) (analyzing studies that have looked at the relationship between attitudes and behavior and 
concluding that, although the relationship is complex, there are indications that the correlation 
between attitudes and behavior is moderate but not perfect). 
75. Laboratory experiments in which subjects are induced to engage in unethical or unlawful 
conduct to further scientific understanding of human behavior have a colorful history in social 
psychology and related disciplines.  Perhaps the most well-known example is the set of studies 
conducted in the 1960s by Stanley Milgram in which volunteers were led to believe they were 
administering electric shocks to other volunteers.  Milgram sought to understand why average, 
otherwise law-abiding citizens could engage in atrocities such as those that occurred in Nazi 
Germany.  In his obedience studies, Milgram demonstrated that most people could be persuaded to 
administer (what appeared to be) painful and harmful electric shocks to another person by applying 
surprisingly little social pressure.  STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 13–26 (1974).  Milgram’s work on obedience to authority undoubtedly 
advanced our understanding of what Hanna Arendt has called “the banality of evil”; at the same 
time, the psychological harm experienced by human subjects in these studies (deriving from the 
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One alternative method for measuring compliance uses a mock trial 
paradigm.  Participants play the role of jurors, and, after hearing the trial 
evidence and the judge’s instructions on the law, they select an individual 
verdict preference of Guilty or Not Guilty.  The trial materials can be 
designed so that the evidence is uncontroverted (either in favor of conviction 
or acquittal).  Thus, in this carefully constructed situation, if participants are 
to follow the law as given to them by the judge, then they must select the 
decision required by the uncontroverted evidence.  Selection of the other 
verdict indicates that the juror has decided to engage in juror nullification—
not complying with the law as explained by the judge.  This method of 
measuring compliance was employed in the present experiment and is 
described in further detail below. 
2. Experimental Method.— 
a. Participants and Materials.—Participants were 228 
undergraduate students.76  Participants were exposed to a prime that 
consisted of a videotaped news story from the television program 60 
Minutes.  The focus of the program was on David Cash, an 18-year-old who 
watched his friend abduct a 7-year-old girl in the women’s bathroom in a 
Nevada casino.  Upon seeing his friend restrain the girl, Cash walked out of 
the bathroom and did nothing while his friend raped and murdered the girl.77  
Cash and the friend spent the next two days gambling, and Cash bragged 
about the crime to friends upon their return home to Los Angeles. 
The 60 Minutes videotape was followed by a written story, which 
appeared to participants to be a newspaper account, but was actually 
fictional.  Participants read one of two versions of the follow-up story.  In the 
Just Outcome story, David Cash is prosecuted for being an accessory to the 
murder after the fact, and he receives a sentence of one year in prison.  In the 
Unjust Outcome story, David Cash receives no punishment.78 
 
knowledge about one’s own capability and willingness to inflict harm on another person) is now 
considered by most in the scientific community to be ethically problematic.  Id. at 193–202. 
76. Of these participants 152 were female, 30 were African American, 36 were Asian or Asian 
American, 26 were Hispanic, and 136 were white.  The mean age was 18.6 years. 
77. Cash claimed that he did not know a crime was in progress until after it was too late.  He 
stated, however, that his friend admitted to the crime immediately after emerging from the 
bathroom. 
78. Pilot testing (with different participants) revealed that, on average, participants believed that 
a sentence of about a year imprisonment was a fair punishment for David Cash.  Pilot test 
participants were also asked to rate the justness of the punishment in the David Cash story for each 
prime condition, on a scale from 1 (extremely unjust) to 7 (extremely just).  Participants rated the 
Just Prime punishment (one year in jail for David Cash) (M = 4.21) significantly more just than the 
Unjust Prime (no punishment for David Cash) (M = 2.87), t(57) = -3.11, p < .01.  There were no 
significant differences based on participant race or gender in the justness ratings of the prime (all 
F’s < 1). 
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In the second part of the experiment, participants served as mock jurors 
in a case unrelated to the David Cash story.  The written materials described 
a homeless defendant accused of stealing a shopping cart he used to store his 
personal belongings.  Participants were informed that stealing a shopping cart 
is a felony.  The case materials indicated that the defendant had two prior 
felony convictions, and that the jurisdiction has a “three strikes and you’re 
out” rule.  The materials made clear that the defendant, if found guilty, must 
be sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of parole. 
The undisputed facts of the case together with the judge’s instructions 
unambiguously indicated that the law requires a verdict of Guilty.  The judge 
explicitly instructed the jurors that they must follow the law as it is given to 
them, and must not let sympathy or prejudice bias their decision.  Thus, 
participants who rendered a Not Guilty “verdict” did so despite the judge’s 
explicit instruction that they were required to apply the law to the facts of the 
case, regardless of how they might feel personally about the law—that is, 
they engaged in juror nullification.79  Each subject’s verdict preference of 
Guilty or Not Guilty thereby served as the measure of compliance or 
noncompliance with the law. 
b. Procedure.—Participants were randomly assigned to the Just 
Outcome or Unjust Outcome condition.  Upon entering the laboratory, they 
were presented with the David Cash news story video and were then 
presented with a follow-up newspaper story in which David Cash either was 
punished (Just Outcome) or was not punished (Unjust Outcome).  A cover 
story was provided to ensure that the prime was assimilated into the later 
judgment: the putative purpose of the study was to assess participants’ judg-
ments about the quality of the journalism represented in the story.  
Participants were asked to provide ratings of the 60 Minutes program, as well 
as of the follow-up newspaper item reporting the outcome of the case.  
Questionnaires elicited participants’ opinions concerning the extent to which 
the news item was clear, in-depth, well-organized, and the like.  The 
questionnaires served as filler tasks. 
As part of the cover story, participants were then greeted by a different 
experimenter and taken to a different room to participate in a “second” 
 
79. The evidence presented makes clear that the homeless defendant who stole the shopping 
cart is undoubtedly guilty.  It was nonetheless expected that some participants would be tempted to 
render a Not Guilty decision in this case because many people would view imposing a punishment 
of life in prison with no parole for a relatively minor theft offense as disproportionate and excessive.  
There is room for disagreement here, of course, as evidenced by the popular support for the “three 
strikes and you’re out” sentencing policies that exist in several states.  See Tom R. Tyler & Robert 
J. Boeckmann, Three Strikes & You Are Out, but Why?: The Psychology of Public Support for 
Punishing Rulebreakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237, 258 (1997) (arguing that support for three 
strikes and you’re out policies originate from concerns about moral cohesion in society).  The 
possibility of different reactions to the shopping cart theft case makes it particularly useful for these 
purposes because the variation in responses permits detection of differences that are attributable to 
the justice prime. 
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experiment.  After signing a separate consent form, participants were 
informed that they would act as mock jurors whose task was to render a ver-
dict in a criminal case.  Participants read the trial materials and then privately 
indicated their personal verdict preference of Guilty or Not Guilty. 
3. Experimental Results.—For the mock trial data, noncompliance rates 
were measured by the proportion of all participants who made Not Guilty 
decisions.  The higher the proportion of Not Guilty decisions, the higher the 
level of noncompliance.  According to the Flouting Thesis, observing legal 
injustice leads to noncompliance.  It was expected, therefore, that compared 
to those primed with a Just Outcome, participants primed with an Unjust 
Outcome in the David Cash case would exhibit a greater rate of 
noncompliance, in the form of a higher proportion of Not Guilty decisions in 
the case of the homeless man.80  This flouting hypothesis is directly contrary 
to another plausible effect of the justice prime: it might be that participants 
told that David Cash was not punished (Unjust Prime) would seek more 
punishment in the case of the homeless man compared to participants told 
that David Cash was punished (Just Prime).  This is because people who 
witness an injustice sometimes become more punitive as a result.81  This 
experiment, therefore, pits the Flouting Thesis against an alternative 
hypothesis (the Anger-Blame hypothesis) that predicts the opposite outcome. 
Analysis of the data revealed that in fact, and contrary to both the 
Flouting Thesis and the Anger-Blame hypothesis, there was no statistically 
significant difference overall between Just and Unjust Prime groups in 
proportion to Not Guilty decisions.82  This failure to detect a difference 
between the two primed groups suggests a boundary condition on the 
Flouting Thesis, such that perceptions of injustice might not influence 
compliance with the law in the context of juror decisionmaking.  To explore 
this possibility further, I separated the participants into two groups based on 
gender.83  This generated a total of four groups: males primed with a Just 
 
80. A total of 21 participants indicated that they had heard of the David Cash story before.  An 
analysis of the data excluding these participants did not change the results reported here. 
81. See Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, 
and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
563, 570 (1998) (finding that participants who watched a film about a bully who beats up someone 
were more likely to behave punitively toward a tort defendant in an unrelated matter, compared with 
participants who did not watch the film). 
82. See Table 2.  The Total Unjust and Total Just percentages (Exp. 2a) do not differ 
statistically.  χ2 (1) = 0.19; p = .66. 
83. The nature of the David Cash case suggested examining whether gender moderates the role 
of the injustice prime on compliance behavior.  This is because the case involved a rape, with a 
female victim and male perpetrators.  The nature of this crime may well have activated gender 
stereotypes that differentially influence male and female participants.  See Sheila T. Murphy, The 
Impact of Factual Versus Fictional Media Portrayals on Cultural Stereotypes, 560 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 165, 165 (1998) (demonstrating that exposure to gender stereotypical 
portrayals can influence subsequent interpretations of unrelated events). 
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Outcome, males primed with an Unjust Outcome, females primed with a Just 
Outcome, and females primed with an Unjust Outcome. 
 Next, the effects of both gender and prime, as well as the interaction 
between gender and prime, on verdict preference were examined.84  The 
Technical Appendix summarizes the logistic regression85 models described 
herein.  A model that included Prime, Gender, and Prime X Gender as 
independent variables revealed that the Prime X Gender interaction had a 
significant effect on verdict.  The patterns of this Prime X Gender interaction 
are illustrated in Table 2.  Recall that the Flouting Thesis predicts that people 
exposed to unjust legal outcomes will be more willing to flout the law 
themselves.  The pattern of results illustrated in Table 2 shows that whereas 
the responses of female participants are consistent with the Flouting Thesis, 
the responses of male participants are not. 
 Note that it is difficult to discern whether the patterns here are 
attributable to the Unjust Prime encouraging women to choose a Not Guilty 
verdict, or to the Just Prime encouraging men to choose a Not Guilty verdict, 
or some combination of both.  To further explore this question, I 
subsequently asked 78 participants drawn from the same population86 as the 
current experiment to indicate their verdict preference in the shopping cart 
theft case.  This group did not read the case of David Cash, and they were not 
exposed to the Unjust Prime or the Just Prime.  Therefore, this group 
provided a baseline measure of the verdict preference regarding the shopping 
cart theft absent any prior exposure to a just or unjust outcome. 
As Table 2 indicates, the proportion of Not Guilty verdicts of female 
participants in the baseline group fell in between the Unjust Prime group and 
the Just Prime group.87  Note that for women, compared to the baseline rate 
of Not Guilty verdicts, the Unjust Prime appears to increase this rate and the 
Just Prime appears to decrease this rate, consistent with the Flouting Thesis.88  
For men, the Unjust Prime appears to have no effect on the rate of Not Guilty 
verdicts, whereas the Just Prime appears to increase this rate.  Because none 
of the tests of simple main effects reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance, it is difficult to interpret the nature of the effect of each prime. 
 
84. Because of the small number of non-white participants, the possible interaction of 
participant race and prime could not be examined reliably. 
85. Logistic regression is a statistical technique for testing relationships between variables when 
the dependent variable (here, verdict preference) is dichotomous (here, there are two possible 
verdict preferences, Guilty or Not Guilty).  The chi-squared test statistic reported here indicates the 
overall fit of the model.  See COHEN ET AL., supra note 68, at 485–86. 
86. Participants in this baseline group shared all of the relevant attributes of the participants in 
the main experiment: they were undergraduates enrolled in the same introductory psychology class 
at the same university during the same academic year as the participants in the main experiment. 
87. None of the tests of simple main effects discussed here reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance, but the patterns illustrated in Table 2 are nonetheless suggestive. 
88. Again, note the caveat that these patterns are merely suggestive. 
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Especially puzzling are the differential effects of the prime that 
depended on the gender of the participant.  These differences were 
unexpected and a definitive explanation requires further study.  As a 
preliminary matter, one might posit that these results be explained by 
differences in attitudes between males and females because of their historical 
position in the legal system.89  These attitudinal differences may have been 
primed by the nature of the materials in the case, because the case involved a 
crime of violence against a female victim committed by male perpetrators.  
Consider first the male participants who learned that the legal system 
imposed on David Cash the punishment he was perceived to have deserved 
(the Just Prime).  A perceived just outcome may have confirmed for male 
participants that the legal system indeed works to serve and protect all of its 
citizens, and, in the absence of any threat to the legitimacy of the legal 
system, male participants subsequently may have felt they had license to 
bend the rules in the name of justice for the homeless defendant in the second 
task.  This explanation for why male participants were more likely to flout 
the rules after observing the legal system meting out a just punishment is 
supported by recent work in experimental social psychology on the 
phenomenon of “moral credentialing.”90  The theory of moral credentialing 
holds that people feel licensed to act on questionable motives when they have 
previously established their credentials as a person of pure motives.91  For 
example, a man who credentials himself as nonsexist by hiring a woman 
might later feel greater license to express a politically incorrect opinion on an 
unrelated topic.  In general, establishing moral credentials serves to liberate 
people to engage in behavior that they might otherwise avoid for fear of 
 
89. See, e.g., SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN 
WHO SAY NO (1987) (arguing that the legal system fails women who say “No”); Mary Becker, The 
Social Responsibility of Lawyers: Access to Justice for Battered Women, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
63, 63 (2003) (“Our legal system routinely fails women who live with domestic violence.”); 
Victoria Nourse, The “Normal” Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law, 75 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 951, 951–53 (2000) (arguing that feminist reforms in the criminal law have 
failed in certain areas); Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the 
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1389 (1997) (arguing that the law of provocation as 
mitigation to murder is in fact biased against women despite being facially neutral); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2154–57 (1995) 
(“Criminal law is—and has been for centuries—a system of rules conceived and enforced by men, 
for men, and against men.”).  It is noteworthy that the historically different treatment of women and 
men by the legal system has been acknowledged by the government itself.  For example, the 
Violence Against Women Act of 2000 was motivated, in part, by Congressional findings that crimes 
against women are often treated less seriously than other crimes.  Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Civil 
Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4–5 
(2000). 
90. Benoît Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 33 (2001). 
91. Id. at 42; see also Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on 
Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005) 
(demonstrating that disclosing a conflict of interest can lead agents to feel morally licensed to give 
advice that is even more biased than if the conflict remained undisclosed). 
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being viewed (by oneself or by others) in a negative light.92  In the current 
study, male participants who observed that the legal system meted out a just 
punishment to David Cash may have subsequently felt licensed to flout the 
law and pronounce as “Not Guilty” the homeless man who was clearly guilty 
of stealing the shopping cart.  According to moral-credentialing theory, 
males who observed the legal system justly punish another male who was 
involved in a crime against a female saw the legal system establishing its 
credentials as nonsexist and concerned with doing justice.  In the subsequent 
task, failure to follow the judge’s instructions is a behavior that might 
ordinarily be viewed in a negative light, but, given the prior credentialing of 
the law, male participants who saw David Cash justly punished felt licensed 
to flout the law and ignore the judge’s instructions. 
The results are also consistent with prior research that demonstrates that 
men and women react quite differently when exposed to media portrayals 
involving female stereotypes.93  At the same time, it must be acknowledged 
that without more evidence it is not yet possible to provide a complete 
explanation for the different responses of men and women observed in 
Experiment 2a.94  To further explore the nature of these unexpected effects, I 
conducted another experiment that used a different sample of participants: 
adult community members from diverse backgrounds.  The next subpart 
describes in detail the procedure and results of Experiment 2b. 
 
TABLE 2.  PERCENTAGE OF NOT GUILTY JUDGMENTS 
(NONCOMPLIANCE) IN EXPERIMENTS 2A & 2B 
  Exp. 2a    Exp. 2b  
 Female Male Total  Female Male Total 
 N = 193 N = 113 N = 306  N = 91 N = 57 N = 149 
Unjust 46 38 43  38 43 39 
Baseline 42 38 40  26 21 24 
Just 32 57 41  19 12 16 
 
92. Monin & Miller, supra note 90, at 42. 
93. See J. Gerard Power et al., Priming Prejudice: How Stereotypes and Counter-Stereotypes 
Influence Attribution of Responsibility and Credibility Among Ingroups and Outgroups, 23 HUM. 
COMM. RES. 36, 52 (1996) (finding that, compared to women, when men are primed with a female 
stereotype, they exhibit larger shifts in credibility assessments of women’s accounts of sexual 
harassment, rape, and spousal abuse). 
94. Recall that, as revealed in the pilot data from participants who only rated the David Cash 
case, male and female subjects perceived a similar level of injustice in the Unjust Outcome version 
of the David Cash story—there were no significant differences in gender in the Likert scale ratings 
of the justness of no punishment for David Cash.  Thus, the observed differences in male and 
female participants’ noncompliance rates in the second part of the experiment were not likely 
caused by different, gender-based attitudes of the justness of the David Cash story prime. 
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D. Experiment 2b: Testing the Flouting Thesis via Mock Juror Behavior 
(Community Sample) 
1. Background.—The Flouting Thesis was confirmed in Experiment 2a 
but, unexpectedly, only among female participants.  To examine whether the 
absence of the predicted effect among male mock jurors in Experiment 2a 
extends to other populations, I conducted a similar experiment using a very 
different sample of participants.  Instead of using undergraduate college 
students from the midwestern United States, I recruited a diverse sample of 
adults from a wide geographic range.  The method of Experiment 2b was 
very similar to that of the previous experiment; exceptions are noted below. 
2. Experimental Method.— 
a. Participants and Materials.—Participants were invited to 
participate via an email message sent to individuals who had previously 
registered as a volunteer to participate in web-based research.95  The email 
message included a URL to a survey hosted on the internet.  Participants 
were offered an incentive for participation in the form of a random draw to 
receive a gift certificate from an online retailer.  Participants were assured 
that their responses would remain anonymous and that identifying 
information would not be collected. 
An email message was sent to one thousand people, inviting them to 
participate.  One hundred and sixty-five people completed the survey.  Of 
these, 16 people failed to correctly answer two questions designed to test 
basic understanding of the materials, so their responses were excluded from 
the results, leaving a final sample size of 149.  Of these, 60% were female, 
and 82% were white.96  The participants’ mean age was 37 years.  Two-thirds 
were U.S. residents.  Of non-U.S. residents, the vast majority (about 90%) 
were residents of common law countries such as Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.  The responses of U.S. and non-U.S. 
residents did not differ statistically; the analysis below includes all respon-
dents in the final sample.  The materials were identical to those used in 
Experiment 2a, with one exception in format.  The David Cash case was 
presented in the form of a print newspaper story, rather than a 60 Minutes TV 
program. 
 
95. Participant recruitment was managed by the StudyResponse Project, hosted by the School 
of Information Studies at Syracuse University, at http://www.studyresponse.com. 
96. About 6% were Black, 7% were Asian, and 2% were Hispanic.  Three percent declined to 
answer.  The gender of one of the participants is unknown; this is reflected in Table 2, which 
indicates that the sample for Experiment 2b included 91 females and 57 males (which sums to 148). 
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b. Procedure.—Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: Just Outcome (David Cash punished), Unjust Outcome (David 
Cash not punished), or Baseline (no exposure to the David Cash case).  Upon 
agreeing to participate in the survey, participants not assigned to the Baseline 
condition were presented with the David Cash news story, and were then 
presented with a follow-up newspaper story in which David Cash either was 
punished (Just Outcome) or was not punished (Unjust Outcome).  Filler 
questionnaires elicited ratings of the writing quality of the news stories.  
Participants assigned to the Baseline condition proceeded directly to the next 
part of the experiment. 
Participants were then informed that they would act as mock jurors 
whose task was to render a verdict in a criminal case.  Participants read the 
trial materials involving the homeless man accused of stealing a shopping 
cart (which were identical to the materials used in Experiment 2a), and then 
privately indicated their personal verdict preference of Guilty or Not Guilty.  
They were then asked to rate the likelihood that the defendant was guilty on a 
seven point scale (1 – Definitely Guilty; 7 – Definitely Not Guilty). 
3. Experimental Results.—As in the prior experiment, noncompliance 
rates were measured by the proportion of participants who made Not Guilty 
decisions.  Unlike in the prior experiment, in Experiment 2b the prime had a 
statistically significant effect on compliance rates of both women and men.97  
The results are illustrated in Figure 2 and are consistent with the Flouting 
Thesis: compared to those primed with a Just Outcome, participants primed 
with an Unjust Outcome in the David Cash case exhibited a greater rate of 
noncompliance, in the form of a higher proportion of Not Guilty decisions in 
the case of the homeless man.98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97. χ2 (2) = 6.95; p = .03.  This test demonstrates that the probability of choosing a Not Guilty 
verdict preference (noncompliance) depended on the exposure to the Prime (Unjust, Just, or 
Baseline). 
98. These results are detailed in the Technical Appendix.  In Model 4, there was an overall 
effect of the prime on noncompliance, and the rate of noncompliance was greater in the Unjust 
Prime group compared to the Just Prime group.  However, the apparent difference in compliance 
rates (illustrated in Figure 2) between the Baseline and Unjust Prime groups, and between the 
Baseline and Just Prime groups, did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.  For 
this reason, it is difficult to determine whether the overall effect of the prime on noncompliance is 
attributable to an increase in flouting due to the Unjust Prime, a decrease in flouting due to the Just 
Prime, or both. 
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The Flouting Thesis was therefore confirmed.  In light of the gender 
differences that emerged in Experiment 2a, gender differences were 
examined in this experiment as well.  As illustrated in Table 2, rates of 
noncompliance for male and female participants were very similar, and this 
was confirmed in the logistic regression analysis, which revealed no 
statistically significant effect of gender on rates of Not Guilty decisions. 
In addition to indicating their verdict preference, participants also rated 
the defendant’s guilt on a seven point scale (1 – Definitely Not Guilty; 
7 – Definitely Guilty).  An analysis of variance99 revealed that prime had a 
statistically significant effect on continuous ratings of guilt.  The pattern here 
was similar to the one that emerged from the dichotomous verdict judgments: 
participants primed with an Unjust outcome rated the defendant as less guilty 
(Mean = 3.4) compared to participants primed with a Just outcome 
(Mean = 4.1) and compared to those in the Baseline condition 
(Mean = 4.2).100 
Despite the preliminary nature of the inferences to be drawn from the 
results of these studies, one feature of all three experiments is noteworthy.  
The duration of exposure to perceived legal injustice was exceedingly 
 
99. F(2, 146) = 10.93; p = .002.  An analysis of variance measures for statistical differences 
between the means of groups whose data are categorical (as opposed to continuous).  See HAYS, 
supra note 71, at 376–81. 
100. The Unjust-Just and Unjust-Baseline pairwise comparisons are both statistically significant 
at p < .01. 
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FIGURE 2.  NONCOMPLIANCE RATES IN EXPERIMENT 2B 
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brief—in some ways artificially so.  In both experiments, participants’ 
exposure to perceived legal injustice lasted no more than 20 minutes.  
Perceived legal injustice that people observe outside of the laboratory is 
sometimes longer in duration and more intense in its experienced effects.101  
How could it be the case that brief exposure to unjust legal rules causes 
people to be less willing to comply with unrelated laws that regulate their 
everyday behavior?  In the next Part, I consider explanations for the 
influence of perceived injustice on general diminished compliance. 
IV. Perceived Injustice in the Law and Its Consequences 
Can perceived legal injustices result in lower respect for the law 
generally?  The experimental evidence presented here suggests that it can.  
Real life events also suggest that this is the case.  Consider, for example, the 
O.J. Simpson verdict, considered to be just by some, but strongly opposed by 
many others.  Opponents of the verdict expressed strong sentiments after the 
verdict was publicized: 
The guy is as guilty as sin. . . .  This trial was a big fraud.102 
O.J. Simpson got to go home to his big king size bed where he used to 
beat his wife. . . .  I’m getting to a point where I even question my 
belief in God.103 
Because of the intense media interest focused on the case, many people 
had a strong opinion about the justice of the verdict.  For those who 
perceived the verdict as unjust, these perceptions were associated with 
broader perceptions about the criminal justice system and the law.  For 
example, a Los Angeles Times poll conducted just after the Simpson verdict 
indicated that 70% of Los Angeles residents had “only some” or “very little” 
confidence in the criminal justice system.104 
Consider also another case that provoked widespread assessments of 
legal injustice: the public reaction to the acquittal of the police officers who 
beat Rodney King.  One half of Californians surveyed shortly after the trial 
said they had confidence in the court system as a result of the acquittals.105  
The polling data following verdicts in this case as well as in the O.J. Simpson 
case suggest that perceived injustice in the law can lead to lowered respect 
for and compliance with the law.  Similarly, the experimental evidence 
 
101. For one example, see the discussion of the O.J. Simpson trial infra Part IV. 
102. Interview with Al [last name withheld], on NPR’s All Things Considered (Oct. 12, 1995). 
103. Interview with Sherrie [last name withheld], on NPR’s All Things Considered (Oct. 12, 
1995). 
104. Cathleen Decker, Faith in Justice System Drops, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at S2; see also 
Cathleen Decker & Sheryl Stolberg, Half of Americans Disagree with Verdict, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
1995, at A1 (reporting similar lack of confidence in the criminal justice system in a national poll not 
limited to Los Angeles residents). 
105. Alexander Peters, Poll Shows Courts Rate Low in Public Opinion, RECORDER, Dec. 11, 
1992, at 1. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art21
2005] Flouting the Law 1427 
 
 
presented in this Article suggests that cases perceived to have been wrongly 
decided, and laws perceived to be poorly conceived or downright foolish, can 
lead to lowered respect for law generally and greater willingness to flout it, 
even in unrelated domains. 
In this Part, I suggest several different possibilities to explain the 
influence of perceived injustice on willingness to flout the law in everyday 
life.  Because the empirical evidence presented in this Article in many ways 
represents an initial foray into previously uncharted territory, the arguments 
that follow are presented in the spirit of conjectures designed to generate 
discussion and debate; more work needs to be done to demonstrate 
persuasively the nature and extent of specific factors contributing to the con-
nection between perceived unjust laws and reduced compliance generally 
with the law.  Nonetheless, I discuss several potential explanations which are 
at least plausible given the experimental evidence. 
A. The Influence of Popular Culture on Attention to Perceived Legal 
Injustice 
In the United States, popular culture is heavily influenced by law and 
the legal system.  Even as early as the nineteenth century, Alexis de 
Tocqueville noted the close connection between American law and American 
culture: 
As most public men are or have formerly been lawyers, they bring the 
usages and the turn of ideas that are their own into the handling of 
affairs.  The jury serves to familiarize all classes with them.  Judicial 
language thus becomes in a way the vulgar language; the spirit of the 
lawyer, born inside the schools and the courts, therefore spreads little 
by little beyond their precincts; it so to speak infiltrates all society, it 
descends into the lowest ranks . . . .106 
The propensity of the law to inhabit the popular imagination in the 
United States is more evident today than ever before.107  Hundreds of movies 
 
106. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 258 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). 
107. See Anthony Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 527; 
Stewart Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and 
Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 185, 185–87, 197 (1987) (arguing that ordinary people 
receive their “everyday legal education” from schooling, media portrayals, and spectator sports, 
rather than from direct experience with the legal system).  Richard Sherwin has argued that law and 
popular culture have become so intertwined that the distinction between reality and fiction has, to a 
large extent, collapsed.  RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE 
BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE ix–x (2000).  Sherwin illustrates his point with the 
example of the videotaped grand jury testimony of President Clinton in which he defended himself 
against charges that he lied under oath about his sexual conduct with a young White House intern.  
Id. at 16.  The television broadcast of the testimony, viewed by millions of people, was featured in 
an article in the New York Times the following day, written by the paper’s movie critic, who drew 
comparisons between the President’s testimony and the film My Dinner with Andre.  Caryn James, 
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involve portrayals of trials.108  A substantial proportion of television 
programs focus exclusively on law, lawyers, or criminal justice, and 
television news magazines (for example, 60 Minutes or 20/20) also regularly 
focus on legal topics.  Included in ABC’s fall 2004 lineup was a seven-part 
documentary depicting a real jury deciding a real capital criminal case.109  
There is at least one cable television station, Court TV, that is devoted 
entirely to legal topics.  Live television coverage is available both for 
momentous national legal events such as Senate hearings on U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice nominations, as well as for routine congressional sessions.  
Many best-selling novels are based on legal topics, and print news magazines 
and newspapers also devote a significant portion of space to law-related 
stories.110  In sum, stories and shows about the law have a broad popular 
appeal in the United States. 
Law-related television dramas, news shows, tabloid shows, newspaper 
articles, and novels tend to highlight certain aspects of the law (for example, 
violent crime, consumer fraud, trials, and prisons) and ignore others for 
dramatic effect.111  As a result, there is a natural focus on whether justice is 
done.  Viewers and readers naturally want to know whether the person or 
people depicted got what they deserved.  The interests of justice are focal 
regardless of whether the story is criminal or civil.  In either case, people 
notice whether the legal system is depicted as regulating behavior in a way 
that makes sense, or conversely, whether it is portrayed as imposing arbitrary 
demands or unfairly exempting people from punishment.112  When the legal 
 
The Testing of a President: Clinton’s Role of a Lifetime Breaks Cinema’s Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
22, 1998, at A16. 
108. For an incomplete list compiled by an online journal at the University of San Francisco 
School of Law, see PICTURING JUSTICE: THE ON-LINE JOURNAL OF LAW & POPULAR CULTURE, 
available at http://www.usfca.edu/pj/index.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005) (listing, among others, 
such movies as Erin Brockovich, The Firm, and A Civil Action). 
109. See ABC News Special: The Jury Room (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 10, 2004). 
110. Occasionally, a case captures the popular imagination (or at least the imagination of 
television producers and newspaper editors) and garners an extraordinary amount of coverage.  For 
example, for the nine months that the O.J. Simpson trial lasted, an ordinary citizen was hard pressed 
to avoid the case.  The trial itself was broadcast on every major television network on a daily basis 
for 133 days (displacing devotees of soap operas and other popular daytime shows).  Gina 
Bellafante, Soap Operas: The Old and the Desperate, TIME, May 29, 1995, at 73.  Coverage of the 
trial was recapped on the news nearly every night, newspapers covered the trial on a daily basis, and 
at the moment the verdict was announced, 150 million people were glued to their TV sets (even 
though it occurred in the middle of the work day). 
111. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 
1588 (1989) (“[T]here are no songs, movies or TV programs about Medicare, dog licenses, zoning 
laws, or overtime parking. . . .  Crime shows, for example, overrepresent violent crimes; shoplifting 
is no great audience-holder, but murder is.”); see also Michael Asimow, When Lawyers Were 
Heroes, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1131 (1996) (describing an evolution in the portrayal of lawyers in films 
from crusading heroes to morally corrupt mercenaries). 
112. See Carolyn L. Hafer, Do Innocent Victims Threaten the Belief in a Just World?  Evidence 
From a Modified Stroop Task, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 165, 172 (2000) 
(demonstrating that small-scale negative events can heighten concern for fairness). 
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system is portrayed as failing to serve the interests of justice (whether in a 
drama or in news reports on real laws or cases), the effects might reach fur-
ther than the particular law or legal procedure that is the focus of the show or 
news story.113  A portrayal of injustice in the legal system may cause people 
to question the integrity of not only the particular law, judge, jury, or 
attorney portrayed but may also cause them to call into question the integrity 
of the legal system itself. 
The cultural influences that lead people to question the integrity of the 
legal system might also have consequences that emerge behaviorally—that 
is, people might violate the law more than they would have if they did not 
question the law’s integrity.  In the next subpart, I will argue that compliance 
decisions are supported and sustained by community norms of commonsense 
justice.  In the context of a general perception that the legal system is 
generally just, these norms nourish a baseline level of behavioral compliance 
with the law.  But if the delicate balance that encourages compliance is 
disturbed, these same community norms can provide the impetus to flout the 
law. 
B. Expressive Law, Perceived Injustice, and Compliance 
The delicate balance that promotes compliance is assisted enormously 
by the fact that, much of the time, the law accurately reflects prevalent mores 
about permissible behavior.114  Thus, criminal law prohibits murder, rape, 
robbery, larceny, and a host of other acts, the propriety of which almost 
everyone agrees.  The general convergence of the requirements of the law 
and commonsense justice means that most people comply with the law most 
of the time because they would have refrained from doing the prohibited act, 
whether it is murder, rape, or robbery, quite apart from the existence of its 
legally prohibited status. 
On the other hand, people also refrain from legally prohibited acts in 
which they may be genuinely tempted to engage, such as certain traffic 
offenses (for example, driving through a red light at an empty intersection) or 
offenses against other persons (for example, punching someone who they 
feel really deserves it).  Democratically produced legislation, for example, 
can be perceived as a signal of community norms about behavior.115  In 
declaring conduct to be prohibited, the law expresses social disapproval of 
that conduct, which can itself strengthen people’s commitment to acting 
legally—even when the fear of punishment is absent.116  Such moral 
commitments can operate, even on people who have not internalized them, 
 
113. See Lerner et al., supra note 81, at 570; Power et al., supra note 93, at 45–47. 
114. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 
375 (2000). 
115. See McAdams, supra note 14, at 402. 
116. Id. 
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through social pressure to avoid the loss of esteem in others’ eyes that would 
result from engaging in prohibited conduct.117  In this way, the law itself 
informs people’s ideas about moral and immoral behavior. 
To some extent, people also obey the law because they feel they owe a 
general obligation to legitimate authority.118  If the law is generally seen as 
accurately reflecting community norms, it is intuitively plausible that people 
will be more inclined to defer to it as a moral authority.119  Under these 
circumstances, the very labeling of a certain act as criminal might make 
 
117. See ANDENAES, supra note 11, at 112 (arguing that “a successful inculcation of moral 
standards may result in social pressure towards acceptable behavior even on persons who have not 
been influenced personally by the moral message of the law”); see also McAdams, supra note 14, at 
355.  McAdams argues that we generally seek the esteem of others.  So long as there is a consensus 
about the esteem-worthiness of engaging in a particular behavior, and so long as people know that 
there is some risk of detection if they engage in that behavior, then a social norm can arise 
governing the behavior.  There is some empirical support for this notion.  The threat of peer 
disapproval exerts a significant influence on self-reported decisions to engage in a criminal offense.  
See Grasmick & Green, supra note 38, at 334 (concluding that social disapproval is one of three 
factors that explains the inhibition of illegal behavior). 
 This idea of norm-regulated behavior is also captured in social psychological theories, such as 
Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action, which takes into account “subjective norms” in 
modeling the attitude-behavior relation.  According to the theory of reasoned action, the most 
important predictor of behavior—intention—is in turn determined by a person’s attitude toward the 
behavior and by the subjective norm.  The subjective norm is simply the person’s perception that 
relevant others in the social environment expect him or her to behave in a certain way.  Thus, if a 
person behaves in a manner contrary to social expectations, he or she can expect negative social 
consequences.  See generally MARTIN FISHBEIN & ICEK AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, INTENTION, 
AND BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND RESEARCH (1975). 
 Of course, social norms vary across cultures and populations.  Sociologist Elijah Anderson has 
argued that among inner city African American youth, there is a code of the street that is centered 
on the issue of respect.  See Elijah Anderson, The Code of the Streets, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 
1994, at 81.  As a result, a person must maintain an appearance (including clothing, gait, and facial 
and verbal expression) that communicates willingness to engage in violence when necessary, must 
be willing to engage in the violent resolution of disputes, and must be willing to seek revenge in the 
event of a threat to one’s self-esteem, all to ensure that respect is secured and maintained.  Id. 
 As another example, norms motivated by fear of peer stigma regarding honor and violence are 
very different in the southern United States, compared to the northern United States.  See generally 
Dov Cohen et al., “When You Call Me That, Smile!”  How Norms for Politeness, Interaction Styles, 
and Aggression Work Together in Southern Culture, 62  SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 257 (1999).  Southern 
white males follow norms of honor, whereby they feel that if they do not respond to an insult, others 
will view them as less manly.  Because this Southern culture of honor has features that involve 
undercurrents of violence, norms of politeness and hospitality have evolved in the South that 
function to keep conflicts below the surface.  Thus, the behavioral ritual of using anger, rudeness, 
biting humor, and insults as warning mechanisms for curbing others’ offensive behaviors is more 
commonly observed in the North.  In sum, although there may be variation in social norms across 
subpopulations, they nonetheless play an important causal role in explaining factors that motivate 
behaviors that are observed with regularity within a community.  Id. 
118. See TYLER, supra note 39, at 57–68 (finding that general feelings of obligation to obey the 
law, and general support for the courts and police predict compliance with specific laws). 
119. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 17, at 476 (arguing that the law can be a moral 
authority even when the harm of the act is not clearly known to society). 
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people more aware of the socially harmful quality of that act.120  For 
example, before the existence of severe criminal punishments for drunk 
driving, many people were unaware of the severity of the risk associated with 
drunk driving.  It may be that drunk driving is increasingly considered in 
moral terms precisely because it has been labeled criminal.121 
Thus, laws that plausibly signal community attitudes result in deference 
and compliance, even if the value expressed had not been previously inter-
nalized by all members of the community, as in the drunk driving example.  
Severe punishment for drunk driving signals the risk of severe harm 
associated with the act; the previously established moral credibility of the 
law generally ensures that the signal will be heeded.  However, laws that are 
perceived as completely implausible signals of community attitudes—that is, 
laws that strike people as so far off the mark that they could not possibly 
represent what the community believes or values—are likely to have 
different effects.  If the law is seen as imposing unjust or immoral 
obligations, then rather than signaling community attitudes, the law instead 
might be perceived as irrelevant, and, intuitively, there would be little reason 
to defer to it as a moral authority.122  For example, if the criminal law were to 
prohibit all sexual intercourse between unmarried couples, most people 
would view that law as discrepant from their own personal moral views 
about sexual intercourse; as a result, they would be willing to disobey the 
law.  Further, such a law might have an even broader effect.  It might cause 
people to view the law generally in a different light—as a set of irrelevant 
and arbitrary rules rather than a coherent expression of community values.123 
 
120. See ANDENAES, supra note 11, at 116 (“It is possible that the fact that a certain act has 
been labeled criminal can make the citizens more aware of its socially harmful character.”).  There 
is some empirical evidence supporting this proposition.  See Leonard Berkowitz & Nigel Walker, 
Laws and Moral Judgments, 30 SOCIOMETRY 410, 420–21 (1967) (reporting an experimental 
finding that knowledge of the existence of a law diminishes the perceived moral propriety of the 
actions regulated by law). 
121. But in the example of drunk driving, it also might be the case that law followed changes in 
social norms.  See Kahan, supra note 67, at 634 (raising the possibility that increasingly 
condemnatory norms led to both tougher drunk driving laws and also greater willingness to enforce 
them). 
122. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 17, at 476 (“Criminal law rules can contribute to 
normative forces . . . only if the community accepts the law as a legitimate source of moral 
authority.”). 
123. Id. at 473–76; see also Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
585, 587 (1998) (discussing the multiple equilibria in systems of social norms and the function of 
law in creating focal points that could possibly tip the system into a new equilibrium).  It is worth 
noting that perceptions of injustice might vary by community, where legal rules that govern issues 
that are of particular importance within a particular community are subject to closer scrutiny.  If a 
legal rule seems outrageously unjust to members of a community, this might cause a decline in the 
moral authority of the law in that community and not in other communities.  Thus, a legal rule 
mandating English-only teaching might be perceived as unjust by Latino communities; a set of legal 
rules that mandates harsher prison sentences for cocaine in crack form than cocaine in powder form 
might be perceived as unjust by African American communities; a legal rule prohibiting free 
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V. Implications and Prescriptions 
A. Sources of Perceived Injustice 
Recognition of initial sources of perceived injustice is a necessary 
condition for controlling the generally diminished compliance it triggers.124  
In the experiments reported in this Article, justice perceptions were induced 
by the conditions of the experiment.  The primary advantage of this 
admittedly artificial procedure is that by randomly inducing perceptions of 
either injustice or justice in participants, we can confidently conclude that the 
observed mean difference in flouting behavior between the two groups was 
attributable to the perceptions of injustice of the prime, as opposed to some 
other cause.  At the same time, inducing people to perceive injustice in the 
laboratory does not advance our understanding of how and why and when 
people perceive legal injustice in everyday life.  Natural sources of perceived 
injustice in the legal system are varied: A person can experience perceived 
legal injustice personally, such as when a person feels that he is unfairly 
targeted by a police officer for a traffic violation because of his race.  
Alternatively, sources of perceived injustice can be experienced vicariously, 
such as when a person sympathizes with defendants harshly punished under 
federal mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.125 
The sources of perceived injustice that are discussed in this Article 
generally fall into two categories: perceived unjust legal decisions, such as 
jury verdicts, and perceived unjust legislation.  The problem of perceptions 
of unjust jury verdicts is perhaps the more difficult problem from a policy 
perspective.  Criminal jury verdicts that are perceived to be unjust oftentimes 
are indeed unjust from a narrow distributive justice perspective: factually 
guilty people are sometimes acquitted by juries, and as a result, people who 
have in fact committed a criminal act sometimes do not receive their just 
desert.  Likewise, factually innocent people are sometimes convicted by 
juries.  Of course, acquittals represent a judgment on the part of the jury or 
judge that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof, and so many 
acquittals that appear unjust from a narrow distributive justice perspective 
are morally defensible when procedural justice considerations are taken into 
account.  Nevertheless, many people find it difficult to give proper weight to 
procedural justice considerations once they have made an assessment about 
the “correct” outcome from a distributive perspective.126  For example, from 
 
downloading of music via the internet might be perceived as unjust by communities of music fans; a 
legal rule prohibiting possession of firearms might be perceived as unjust by the citizenry in discrete 
parts of the country. 
124. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 17, at 488. 
125. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 860 (2000) (providing minimum penalties for various 
drug offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (providing minimum penalties for carrying a firearm 
during or in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime). 
126. See Skitka & Houston, supra note 45, at 305. 
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the point of view of a person who believes that O.J. Simpson did in fact kill 
two people without legal justification or excuse, there is little solace in the 
prospect that the jury held reasonable doubts about the prosecution having 
proved every element of each crime—the distributive justice worry over-
whelms procedural justice concerns in this context.127  In sum, because 
information about jury verdicts is, and should be,128 available to the public, 
perceived unjust jury verdicts are bound to occur and to cause general 
diminished compliance in the ways outlined in this Article. 
A second prototype of perceived legal injustice is legislation, or other 
legal regulation, that conflicts with commonsense notions of what justice 
requires.  Perhaps the most salient historical example is the prohibition on the 
manufacture, distribution, or sale of alcoholic beverages imposed by the 
Eighteenth Amendment.  During the period when the Eighteenth Amendment 
was in force, the law prohibiting alcohol was notoriously disobeyed.129  
Toward the end of the prohibition era, prominent leaders worried that such 
widespread lawlessness had weakened respect for the law generally, leading 
to widespread diminished compliance with laws unrelated to prohibition—
that is, they worried about the Flouting Thesis.130  Contemporary examples 
are not always associated with the same extent of widespread disobedience, 
but these examples provoke controversy and heated discussion nonetheless.  
These include particular aspects of drug laws (such as the sentencing 
disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses in the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines),131 mandatory minimum sentences of incarceration 
 
127. See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
128. It is possible that televising criminal trials may exacerbate feelings of perceived injustice 
regarding verdicts in notorious cases.  On the other hand, televised trials provide a unique 
opportunity to educate the public about the importance of procedural and other safeguards that 
sometimes lead to verdicts that are unjust from a narrow distributive perspective but that serve the 
interests of justice in other ways.  The considerations weighing in favor of and against the televising 
of criminal trials are numerous and extend beyond the scope of this Article.  See David A. Harris, 
The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the 
Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 786 (1993); Ruth Ann Strickland & Richter H. 
Moore, Jr., Cameras in State Courts: A Historical Perspective, 78 JUDICATURE 128, 135 (1994) 
(pointing out that televised trials on Court TV “allow[] viewers to become better educated about the 
cumbersome as well as sensational aspects of the judicial process”); Kelly L. Cripe, Comment, 
Empowering the Audience: Television’s Role in the Diminishing Respect for the American Judicial 
System, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235, 238–40 (1999) (arguing that increased media coverage of trials 
focuses public resentment on the jury, undermining the perceived legitimacy of the justice system as 
a whole). 
129. See DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 28–32 (1979) (describing the 
ongoing difficulty of enforcing prohibition); Harry G. Levine, The Birth of American Alcohol 
Control: Prohibition, the Power Elite and the Problem of Lawlessness, 1985 CONTEMP. DRUG 
PROBS. 63, 75 (“[T]he report (by Hoover’s National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement) found widespread disobedience to prohibition and seemed to conclude that national 
prohibition could never be enforced.”). 
130. See KYVIG, supra note 129, at 69–70 (noting that those who opposed prohibition 
expressed concerns about “spreading disrespect for law”); Levine, supra note 129, at 69. 
131. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 
1322 (1995) (“By demanding too much doctrinal order, we have produced a doctrine that demands 
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for certain crimes,132 sodomy statutes,133 foster care regulations,134 and 
smoking ordinances,135 to name just a few. 
Laws that are enacted with the intention to change social norms and 
behavior sometimes are met with resistance if the law departs too 
substantially from the view of ordinary people.136  Many discrepancies 
between legal regulation and commonsense attitudes constitute avoidable 
sources of lawbreaking because perceptions of injustice and the diminished 
respect for the legal system that follow can destabilize the law-abiding 
behavior of ordinary people.137  By limiting the incongruities between the 
condemnation expressed by a particular legal rule and the severity of con-
demnation implicit in public attitudes, perceived injustice can be 
diminished.138  The key question, then, is how to go about reducing 
discrepancies between legal rules and citizen attitudes. 
B. Reducing the Gap Between Legal Rules and Commonsense Justice 
In principle, there are several ways to better harmonize legal rules and 
public attitudes.  If there is an existing social norm regarding the issue 
addressed by the law, one method involves reforming the legal rule in 
question to better align it with the existing social norm; another method 
involves altering the social norm to better align it with the existing legal 
rule.139  Legal rules sometimes do not directly implicate social norms, but 
instead implicate what are better described as socially shared attitudes.  In 
these cases, it is possible for the law to conform to public attitudes.  I discuss 
these possibilities in turn. 
1. Modifying Legal Rules.—Modifying the legal rule to better reflect 
the existing social norm involves a number of considerations.  First, we must 
make a determination that the existing norm promotes desirable social 
policies and that the legal rule would be more effective at promoting those 
policies if it were to better reflect the existing social norm.  In other words, 
 
too little justice.”); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1795 
(1998) (“Differential enforcement breeds resentment, which undermines the law’s normative 
force.”). 
132. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal 
Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223; Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing 
Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 
40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87 (2003). 
133. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
134. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS 120–21, 205 (2002). 
135. Richard Pérez-Peña, A City of Quitters?  In Strict New York, 11% Fewer Smokers, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 12, 2004, at A1. 
136. See Kahan, supra note 67, at 607–09. 
137. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 17, at 476. 
138. Id. 
139. Of course, these two methods are not mutually exclusive; both the rule and the social norm 
can be modified in an attempt to make them more compatible. 
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we must decide that we want the legal rule to look more like the social norm.  
Of course, it is not always the case that the social norm is laudable.  
Historically, there are many instances of prevailing social norms that, in 
retrospect, many would agree were wrongheaded.  These include the norm 
against the equal participation of women, racial minorities, and gays and les-
bians in social and political life; the norm against homosexual sex; the norm 
against interracial marriage; and the norm permitting harm to the 
environment (such as littering and polluting the air and water), to name just a 
few. 
Second, assuming the existing norm is desirable, we must make a 
determination that there is in fact a unified social norm to which we can 
conform the legal rule.  This is often not the case.  For example, some of the 
most contentious issues of the day, such as same-sex marriage, abortion, 
physician-assisted suicide, and the death penalty involve such deep 
differences of opinion that we cannot hope to neatly conform the legal rule to 
existing norms.  In these cases, our best strategy is to rely on fair procedures 
to ensure that the decisions of legal actors are viewed as legitimate and thus 
likely to be complied with.140 
Sometimes, the legal rule in question does not really implicate a social 
norm but instead implicates a socially shared attitude about what justice 
requires.141  In these situations, it is possible to measure empirically the 
socially shared attitude and then conform the law to the consensus (assuming 
that there is no independent reason to think that the consensus makes for bad 
legal policy).142  For example, criminal law rules governing attempted crimes 
do not really implicate an existing, articulable social norm regarding when 
and whether it is permissible to attempt to commit crimes.  Nevertheless, 
people are likely to have intuitions about what type of conduct ought to be 
punished as an attempted crime in specific situations.143  Moreover, social 
scientists using the right types of survey instruments and samples ought to be 
able to measure these popular intuitions.144 
That this type of endeavor is possible was demonstrated by Paul 
Robinson and John Darley in their book Justice, Liability, and Blame.  They 
tested several different criminal law doctrines (e.g., attempt, justification, 
excuse, and the like) against the opinions of citizens regarding what the 
content of these rules should be.  But instead of asking questions about 
 
140. TYLER, supra note 39, at 76–79. 
141. See John Darley et al., Enacting Justice: The Interplay of Individual and Institutional 
Perspectives, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 458, 461 (M.A. Hogg & J. Cooper 
eds., 2003) (arguing that communities’ shared sense of justice help them determine which offenses 
deserve punishment). 
142. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: 
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 16–20 (1995). 
143. Id. at 21. 
144. Id. at 27–28. 
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criminal law rules in the abstract, the authors asked people to give their 
opinions about factual scenarios.  For example, should a person who cases 
out a jewelry store with the intention to burglarize it, but then goes no 
further, be held criminally liable for attempting to commit a crime?  From 
these responses, we can infer what people think the rule ought to be.  
Robinson and Darley found that, although modern criminal law doctrine 
imposes liability as soon as a person takes a substantial step toward an 
offense, most people would impose no punishment when faced with the facts 
of such a case.145  Where the legal rule departs from the consensus of the lay 
public regarding just desert, lawmakers can modify the legal rule to reflect 
popular consensus, as long as such consensus can be justified in criminal law 
theory.  This assumes, of course, that the theoretical considerations that led to 
the adoption of the original rule do not overwhelm the reasons for adopting 
the new, more “popular” rule.  In the case of attempt crime standards, there is 
a proliferation of different approaches, and there seems to be no real 
consensus among scholars or lawmakers about which approach is superior.146  
In this case, therefore, a sensible approach might be to adopt the rule that 
best accords with commonsense notions of what justice requires.147 
Note, however, that we need not limit ourselves to considering only 
those legal rules about which expert consensus is lacking.  There may be 
other rules that depart from socially shared intuitions that are, on the one 
hand, widely accepted by legal experts, but on the other hand, amenable to 
review and revision.  Of course, the decision to revise an existing rule in 
order to better harmonize it with commonsense intuitions must never be 
taken lightly.  This decision process necessarily entails a balancing between 
theoretical justifications underlying the rule, and justifications for the 
 
145. Id. at 25. 
146. These include: the physical-proximity doctrine (liability imposed if the act directly tends 
toward completion of the crime), the dangerous-proximity doctrine (liability for attempt becomes 
more likely as the gravity and probability of the crime, as well as the proximity of the act to the 
completed crime, increases), the indispensable-element test (liability imposed when the defendant 
has control over all indispensable aspects of the crime), the probable-desistance test (liability 
imposed if the crime intended will result without interruption from outside sources), the abnormal-
step approach (liability imposed when the defendant goes beyond the point where most others 
would desist), the unequivocality test (liability imposed when the defendant’s conduct manifests an 
intent to commit the crime), and the substantial-step test (liability imposed when the defendant does 
any act that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime).  See JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 749–50 (3d ed. 2003). 
147. An important caveat is in order at this point.  This type of inquiry must, by nature, be 
grounded in data.  One cannot establish the criminal law in the community’s sense of justice when 
claims about this sense of justice are based only on the speaker’s own intuitions, which the speaker 
assumes are shared by the public at large.  Instead, this inquiry must be grounded in the 
community’s sense of justice as measured by empirical observation.  Robinson and Darley’s book, 
Justice, Liability, and Blame, is a step in the right direction in this regard.  As other commentators 
have observed, there are methodological issues regarding sampling in these studies, but it is 
important to keep in mind that this was an initial foray into the measurement of community justice 
intuitions.  See Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us?, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 601, 605 (2000). 
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existing shared intuition.  One can imagine situations in which there is a 
sound reason for the existing rule and a less sound—but still justifiable 
reason for an alternate rule; if the alternate rule comports better with socially 
shared intuitions, this fact weighs in favor of its adoption but is not, in itself, 
determinative. 
2. Facilitating Understanding of Existing Legal Rules.—The second 
main way to reduce the gap between legal rules and commonsense justice is 
to change the prevailing conception of justice.  Education of the public 
regarding legal rules and procedures is a key method to pursue.  Most people 
are woefully unaware of existing legal requirements.148  One study asked the 
residents of four different states about their knowledge of four different 
criminal law rules.149  In each of the states, the criminal law took a minority 
view on at least one of the four rules, so that the rules tested varied from state 
to state.150  Yet, with only one exception, residents of all of the four states 
tested had essentially identical beliefs about the law in their state.151  The 
actual legal rule in effect in their state apparently had little or no influence on 
what people believed the rule to be.  In fact, peoples’ beliefs about what the 
law is in their state did not track so much the majority rule as they tracked 
peoples’ own moral intuitions about what they thought the rule ought to 
be.152 
Given the goal of reducing the gap between legal rules and 
commonsense justice, the challenge is not only to educate people about the 
content of existing legal rules, but, in addition, to facilitate a public under-
standing of the rationale for existing rules.  Sometimes, the facts of a well-
publicized criminal case will help to make known an existing, but previously 
little-known legal rule; but if the rationale for the rule is not apparent, that 
rule might fall into disrepute if it is contrary to commonsense notions of 
 
148. See John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 165 (2001). 
149. Id. at 170–71.  The rules tested were: duty to assist a stranger in danger, the use of deadly 
defensive force in situations where the victim can safely retreat, duty to report a known felony, and 
the use of deadly force in protection of property. 
150. Id. at 169. 
151. Id. at 181–82.  The one exception was the rule about use of deadly force in defense of 
property; here, Texas residents correctly indicated that the law of their state permits the use of 
deadly force against an unarmed fleeing burglar. 
152. Id. at 183.  Note that there is a sense in which widespread ignorance of the law undermines 
the urgency of the Flouting Thesis: if most people do not know the law, then they will not perceive 
injustice in the law (especially if they simply assume that the law comports with their own moral 
intuitions) and will therefore have no motive to flout it.  On the other hand, widespread ignorance of 
the law does not by any means blind citizens to pockets of perceived legal injustice.  Moreover, the 
common assumption that the law probably comports with one’s own intuitions could create a 
situation that is more (not less) likely to induce flouting.  This is because people who are unaware of 
the actual legal rule might be shocked when they learn that the rule in fact clashes with socially 
shared intuitions, and this, in turn, might heighten one’s sense of injustice.  Further evidence is 
needed to shed light on this question. 
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justice, or if it leads to a result widely regarded as unjust.153  In addition, the 
perception of an unjust result might arise because of application of 
procedural rules that most would regard as just and necessary if only they 
were made aware of the existence of the procedural safeguard and associated 
rationale.154 
C. Caveats and Unanswered Questions 
It is important at this point to acknowledge several questions that 
remain unanswered.  One important question left open by the experiments 
reported in this Article is: How stable is the impulse to flout the law in the 
face of perceived injustice?  Measures of how long the perceptions of injus-
tice induced by the procedure were not included in these experiments.  Even 
more uncertain is how long the effects of perceived injustice last outside of 
the laboratory.  These are important yet unanswered questions and are 
worthy of examination. 
A limitation of the experiments discussed in this Article is that actual 
lawbreaking was not measured.  Experiments 2a and 2b measured actual 
behavior, but to the extent that the behavior is categorized as lawbreaking (in 
the sense that participants violated the judge’s instructions to follow the law), 
it is important to note that the behavior in question was apparently motivated 
by a desire to do justice, rather than an attempt to reap self-interested gains.  
Experiment 1, by contrast, measured self-interested lawbreaking, but 
measured only stated willingness to break the law rather than actual 
behavior.  The primary difficulty in measuring behavioral lawbreaking in an 
experimental setting is an ethical one: there is only a narrow range of 
unlawful behavior that an ethical experimenter can comfortably induce 
participants to engage in.  Alternative methods, such as unobtrusive 
observation of behavior outside the laboratory, as well as archival records of 
lawbreaking following perceptions of an actual event inducing perceptions of 
injustice, are promising routes for further investigation. 
Another question left unanswered by the initial set of experiments 
discussed in this Article is the nature of the psychological mechanism that 
drives willingness to flout.  The experimental results suggest that perceiving 
an unjust law or outcome increases the likelihood of flouting the law.  But it 
is unclear what it is about perceived injustice that leads to flouting.  One pos-
sibility is that people explicitly revise their general attitudes toward the legal 
system upon learning about an unjust legal rule or result, and based on these 
revised attitudes, make a conscious decision to flout.  At the other extreme, it 
 
153. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 17, at 476. 
154. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of 
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) (arguing that people’s perceptions of legal authorities are based 
largely on their subjective assessments of the fairness of the procedural rules that are followed). 
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is possible that people’s increased willingness to flout does not rise to the 
level of conscious thought—that is, people who resist legal rules following 
perceived injustice might not attribute their behavior to the prior perception 
of injustice.  It is also unclear whether increased flouting is constrained to 
perceptions of injustice, or whether other, more general negative experiences 
can lead to flouting.  For example, it is possible that negative mood is 
responsible for increased willingness to flout observed in the experiments, 
rather than perceived injustice per se.  These questions can be examined in 
the future by separating out the effects of mood from injustice and by 
prompting people to provide an account of their own attributions for their 
own willingness to flout. 
This Article focused on two prototypes: perceived unjust outcomes and 
perceived unjust legal rules.  Of course, there are many other possible 
sources of perceived legal injustice.  For example, the perceived injustice of 
the treatment of Rodney King at the hands of Los Angeles police officers (as 
opposed to the acquittal of those officers of criminal charges that touched off 
civil unrest) is an example of unjust enforcement of criminal law rules and 
procedures that are not, in and of themselves, particularly controversial.  
Indeed, it may be the case that legal rules and regulations do not often trigger 
perceptions of injustice in the abstract because ordinary citizens do not often 
attend to them in the abstract, in the way that participants in Experiment 1 
were prompted to do.  On the other hand, legal rules certainly are vulnerable 
to perceptions of injustice when they give rise to an outcome or decision 
which is itself perceived to be unjust.155  In these cases, the outcome of 
individual cases is the mechanism that gives rise to the perception that the 
rule itself is unjust.  As noted earlier,156 sources of perceived injustice were 
manipulated in the laboratory in the experiments reported in this Article; 
future work could examine actual sources of perceived injustice in everyday 
life.  Examination of sources of perceived injustice would help delineate the 
circumstances under which people are more likely to be prompted to flout the 
law. 
VI. Conclusion 
This Article explored the widely assumed but little-tested belief that 
specific instances of perceived injustice in the legal system can lead to 
diminished deference to the law generally.  Experiment 1 tested the influence 
 
155. Consider, for example, the lobbying group Families Against Mandatory Minimums 
(FAMM), the purpose of which is to “challenge inflexible and excessive penalties required by 
mandatory sentencing laws.”  See About, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, available at 
http://famm.org/rs_mission_strategy.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).  The group focuses on the 
perceived injustice of a set of legal rules (mandatory minimum sentencing statutes), but does so by 
making salient a variety of perceived unjust sentencing decisions in individual cases. 
156. See supra subpart IV(A). 
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of perceived unjust legal rules regarding civil forfeiture, distribution of the 
income tax burden, and the right to privacy, and demonstrated that perceived 
unjust legal rules cause people to report being more likely to engage in law-
breaking in their daily lives.  Experiments 2a and 2b tested the influence of a 
perceived unjust outcome of a criminal case in which a person peripherally 
involved in a serious crime is not prosecuted.  Experiments 2a and 2b 
demonstrated that the failure to punish a person who is perceived to deserve 
punishment can, in some circumstances, lead people to display a greater 
willingness to disregard the law in their role as jurors.  This willingness to 
flout, however, was qualified in Experiment 2a by the gender of the mock 
juror and the facts surrounding the perceived injustice: in a rape case where a 
potential accomplice goes unpunished, women were more willing than men 
to disregard the law in their role as jurors.  Although this relationship 
between gender and perceived injustice was observed only in the 
undergraduate sample (Experiment 2a) and was not observed in a more 
general community sample (Experiment 2b), these stark gender differences 
nonetheless highlight the need for more research regarding the Flouting 
Thesis.  It is undoubtedly false that perceived injustice in the legal system 
leads to greater willingness to break the law for all people, in all 
circumstances, at all times.  This Article presents the first experimental 
evidence that such a relationship exists at all; but as such, it is only a start, 
and more research is needed to understand the contours of this relationship. 
The notion that specific instances of legal rules, practices, and decisions 
that clash with commonsense notions of justice can promote widespread 
lawbreaking is an idea with far-reaching implications for policies about the 
content of criminal law rules and sentencing regimes, for promoting public 
education and awareness about the legal system and about the rationales that 
underlie controversial rules and procedures, and for examining and 
rethinking legal rules and policies that can promote diminished respect for 
the legal system. 
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Technical Appendix 
Logistic Regression Analysis for Likelihood of Guilty Verdict 
as a Function of Prime and Gender 
 
 Exp. 2a Exp. 2a Exp. 2a Exp. 2b Exp. 2b 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Prime      
Estimate  1.92   0.19 
S.E.  0.82   0.70 
Wald Chi square (df)  5.44(1) 5.85(2) 6.68(2) 0.08(1) 
p  0.02 0.05 0.036 0.78 
Exp (B)  6.83   1.21 
Unjust vs. Just      
Estimate -0.12   1.18  
S.E. 0.27   0.48  
Wald Chi square (1) 0.19   6.15  
p 0.66   0.013  
Exp (B) 1.12   3.26  
Unjust vs. Baseline      
Estimate   0.32 0.71  
S.E.   0.90 0.44  
Wald Chi square (1)   0.13 2.52  
p   0.72 0.11  
Exp (B)   1.38 2.02  
Just vs. Baseline      
Estimate   -1.60 -0.48  
S.E.   0.94 0.52  
Wald Chi square (1)   2.85 0.85  
p   0.09 0.36  
Exp (B)   0.20 0.62  
Gender      
Estimate  1.03 0.19  -0.88 
S.E.  0.42 0.25  0.64 
Wald Chi square (1)  6.01 0.61  0.19 
p  0.014 0.44  0.89 
Exp (B)  2.80 1.21  0.91 
Prime X Gender      
Estimate  -1.33   0.01 
S.E.  0.58   0.48 
Wald Chi square (2)  5.32 6.01  0.00 
p  0.021 0.048  0.98 
Exp (B)  0.26   1.01 
N 228 228 306 149 148 
Model Chi square (df) 0.19(1) 6.92(3) 7.16(5) 6.96(2) 0.82(3) 
p 0.66 0.074 0.21 0.031 0.84 
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